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The intensity of typhoons that enter the Philippine Area of 
Responsibility has been increasing over the last 50 years. It is therefore 
imperative to explore how to enhance the adaptive capacity and 
resilience of vulnerable communities. This study was conducted to 
analyze the adaptive capacity and adaptation strategies of households, 
local government units (LGUs) and community organizations (COs) 
during Typhoon Milenyo (Xangsane). It assessed the barriers that 
constrain their adoption of recommended adaptation options and 
recommend measures that could guide the stakeholders to overcome 
adaptation barriers and enhance resilience. 
The data collected through interviews with LGU staff and CO members 
and survey of households in  lowland and coastal communities of 
Tanauan City and San Juan, Batangas revealed that: a) households have 
not stepped-up their adaptation strategies to cope with the  increasing 
risks associated with typhoons of increasing intensity; b) COs are 
willing to help but their participation in disaster risk management has 
not yet been institutionalized; and c) LGUs recognized that there are 
other adaptation possibilities that could make the communities less 
vulnerable to typhoon events. Greater awareness about the climate 
change phenomena and the need to enhance preparedness and adaptive 
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Tropical cyclone is the most commonly occurring natural hazard in the 
Philippines causing billions of pesos worth in socio-economic losses and other forms of 
damages. Analysis of 59-year data on Philippine typhoons revealed that their intensity 
had been increasing, especially since the 1990s. It is therefore important for people, 
communities, and institutions to enhance their capacity to adapt to typhoon events and 
improve resilience to their probable risks. 
This research work focused on local government units (LGUs), community 
organizations (COs), and households in the province of Batangas and their experience 
with Typhoon Milenyo (international name Xangsane) in September 2006. Using data 
from primary and secondary sources, key informant interviews, and focus group 
discussions (FGDs), the study assessed their adaptive capacity and how this capacity was 
translated to adaptation behavior as manifested in their specific responses to Typhoon 
Milenyo.  
The LGUs‘ response to typhoon and flooding was essentially ‗relief, rescue, and 
rehabilitation‘ in nature. However, they recognized that there were other adaptation 
possibilities that could make the communities less vulnerable to typhoon events. This 
indicates some gaps between adaptation practices actually taken and practices 
recommended but were not done. One acknowledged gap in LGU response was better 
preparedness to typhoon event, showing the importance of establishing an early warning. 
This system would inform the public and decision makers about critical adaptation 
decision points such as what adaptation options are available and what adaptation 
strategies would be most appropriate. Other recommended strategies are medium to long- 
term in nature in order to mitigate or prevent damages from future typhoons. Constraints 
to adoption of more effective adaptation options pertain to weak enforcement of existing 
policies and standards (e.g., land use policy, building code), which are some of the 
underlying risk factors that could exacerbate vulnerability of the localities. Other barriers 
include unclear operational procedures; financial constraints, particularly for long-term 
and infrastructure development measures; and integration of climate risk management to 




While LGUs rate their adaptive capacity high, their programs and policies and 
human resource capability were apparently low. There may be a need to further enhance 
this capacity for more effective and sustainable adaptation strategies.  Partnership with 
other sectors of society is crucial, thus the current limited role of community 
organizations should also be intensified. 
The second part of the study analyzed the adaptive capacity of households and 
their experiences and adaptive behavior to deal with the impacts of Typhoon Milenyo. 
Primary data were generated from personal interviews of lowland and coastal households 
in two localities of Batangas.  
Results of the analysis showed that, overall, lowland and coastal households had 
the same adaptive capacity index. However, their differences emerged when it came to 
specific indicators. Lowland households had the highest capacity index in terms of 
infrastructure, followed by technology, and lowest in terms of social capital. On the other 
hand, coastal households fared highest in social capital, followed by economic adaptive 
capacity, and lowest in skills and knowledge. 
The damage brought by Typhoon Milenyo varied by sector. The cost of damage 
to houses was highest in the coastal areas, while agricultural production suffered the most 
in the lowland areas. Recovery period for majority of affected households was within one 
month, but agricultural households took a longer period to recover as the income they 
could have generated from their harvest was lost. During the typhoon, however, there was 
an increase in fish catch and sales of retail business.  
Adaptation strategies of the households to deal with Typhoon Milenyo were 
mostly structural such as reinforcing their houses and household properties as well as 
behavioral such as securing food, water, and other household needs including boats and 
livestock.  Some collective action took place in the community particularly after the 
typhoon as relief operations were mobilized.   
Some households were not able to take some possible adaptation options because 
of financial reasons. Those who were not willing to adopt strategies recommended by 
experts such as moving to a safer place preferred to stay in their own homes.  The 
awareness of households on climate change-related events has not been always translated 
to individual actions. The lack of action was not only because of the low adaptive 
capacity of households but also because of their attitude and perception over climate 
change-related problems and solutions. 
The lessons learned from the Typhoon Milenyo experience showed the 
importance of disaster preparedness.  Households expressed the need for financial 
assistance and hard infrastructure to deal with typhoon events. However, majority of the 
respondents ―agree‖ to ―strongly agree‖ that their experience with an extreme typhoon 
event such as Milenyo was a matter of fate over which they had little control.  
The respondents pointed to the role of LGUs in minimizing risks and facilitating 
rehabilitation recovery, which involve early warning system, information campaign, and 
monitoring system. Community organizations could also enhance their role in providing 





Policymakers need to be aware of the barriers to action and analyze policy options 
accordingly. Relevant policy areas include communication and public education and 






1.1 Rationale  
Tropical cyclone is the most commonly occurring natural hazard in the 
Philippines. A record high of 20 tropical cyclones pass through the Philippine Area of 
Responsibility (PAR) each year causing billions of pesos in damages. Analysis of 59-year 
data on tropical cyclones revealed that the intensity of typhoons is getting stronger, 
especially since the 1990s (PAGASA 2008). Records also show that about 70 percent of 
the disasters experienced in the Philippines are hydro-meteorological in nature (Hilario 
2009). Tropical cyclones account for around 47 percent of the average annual rainfall in 
the country. It is therefore not surprising if flooding is usually associated with typhoon 
events. It is important for people, communities, and institutions to develop adaptive 
capacity to minimize risks, damages, and losses and to enhance resilience to typhoon 
events.   
In 2006, nine of the 20 typhoons that entered the PAR landed/crossed the country. 
Of these, five were considered deadly including Typhoon Milenyo (international name 
Xangsane), which stayed in the PAR from September 25-29, 2006. Typhoon Milenyo,  
the worst typhoon to hit the Philippines in a decade, was classified as Category 4 with a 
maximum wind of 230 kph. It affected the highest number of municipalities (277) and 
caused the highest total cost of damages amounting to over PhP6.6 billion (US$0.1375 
billion). Southern Luzon was among the hardest hit, particularly the provinces of Laguna, 
Cavite, and Batangas.  
Local government institutions are mandated by law to be in the forefront of 
disaster risk management (DRM) and climate risk management (CRM). Response to 
climate-induced events, such as typhoons and the consequent floodings that these may 
cause, largely depend on the LGUs‘ technical and financial capability, available 
resources, institutional capacity, attitude, and behavior as well as economic and 
development preferences of LGU officials. However, responding to climate change 
events should not be the sole responsibility of the government. Community organizations 
(COs) can be effective partners of the LGU and the community. Likewise, it is important 
for individual households to fully understand the potential risks and undertake 
appropriate response strategies.  
In this light, this research work focused on LGUs, COs, and households as they 
responded to typhoon-associated risks in the Philippines, particularly with Typhoon 
Milenyo in 2006. Sections 2 and 3 present the methodology and the profile of the study 
sites, respectively. Section 4 examines the adaptive capacity and adaptation strategies of 
4 
 
LGUs in dealing with typhoon-related risks.  It also shows a gap analysis of the LGUs‘ 
adaptation behavior by examining their actual adaptation practices before, during, and 
after the event vis-à-vis recommended strategies. These are the actions, which with the 
benefit of hindsight, could have been taken and should be taken in the future under 
similar circumstances, to enhance adaptive capacity and resilience. Section 5 presents the 
adaptive capacity of households, the impacts of Typhoon Milenyo, adaptation behavior of 
households, and other adaptation possibilities and constraints. Section 6 discusses the role 
of COs in adaptation to Typhoon Milenyo, and Section 7 presents the institutional 
challenges and recommended courses of actions.  
1.2 Objectives 
The research was carried out with the following objectives: 
1. assess the adaptive capacity of LGUs and COs using specific indicators, namely: 
institutions and governance; risk assessment, monitoring, and warning; 
knowledge, education, and information; climate change adaptation technology 
and infrastructure; and underlying risk factors; 
2. identify the adaptation strategies of LGUs, COs, and households before, during, 
and after Typhoon Milenyo;  
3. identify other possible adaptation options that LGUs could have taken, and 
analyze gaps between actual and recommended practices and the factors 
constraining adoption of recommended options; and 
4. draw lessons from the Typhoon Milenyo experience and recommend measures 




2.1  Study Sites Selection 
The selection of study sites underwent several stages and a number of selection 
criteria.  The basic concept of the selection process was to choose the site that is exposed 
to both physical and outcome risks and where adaptive capacity enhancement would be 
most meaningful.  Based on these principles, the first stage involved the study of 
Philippine typhoon patterns. Northern Luzon and Bicol provinces are the regions that are 
most susceptible to typhoons, followed by Central Luzon and the CALABARZON 
region.   
Then, using the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) data, the extent 
of typhoon damages were assessed to determine the vulnerable regions.  This assessment 
revealed that the vulnerable region was Southern Luzon because it is relatively more 
developed and densely populated. In this region, Laguna, Batangas, and Cavite were the 
provinces that were the mostly affected by typhoons.  The next step was to find out which 
of the municipalities in these provinces incurred major damages in their lowland and 
coastal ecosystems and kept a good enough record of typhoon-related damages. Only 
Batangas could provide more detailed information on the extent of damages down to the 
municipal level. Hence, Batangas province was chosen as the sample province.  
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Based on secondary data obtained from the Provincial Disaster Coordinating 
Council (PDCC), the top two municipalities of Batangas that suffered heavy damages 
from Typhoon Milenyo and where the two types of ecozones (i.e., coastal and lowland 
barangays) are located were San Juan and Tanauan City (Figure 1). This stage-wise 
selection process revealed that San Juan and Tanauan City were the most suitable study 
sites. Forty (40) of the 42 barangays of San Juan and 44 of the 48 barangays of Tanauan 
City suffered damages in agriculture, fisheries, public and private infrastructures, and 
livelihood sources when they were hit by Typhoon Milenyo. These municipalities also 
suffered heavy damages when they were hit by three typhoons in 2006 and one in 2008.  
In these two municipalities, two lowland and two coastal barangays that suffered 
the heaviest losses during Typhoon Milenyo were chosen as the focal study sites. These 
were Barangays Tipas and Ticalan in San Juan and Barangays Altura Bata and Ambulong 
in Tanauan City.   
 
Figure 1. Map of the Philippines showing Tanauan City and San Juan, Batangas 
Sources of Photos: www.dadomontano.com; www.mapladia.com; www.dbmp.philrice.gov.ph and www.tanauancity.gov.ph 
 
2.2  Data Collection and Analysis 
This report covers municipal and community level data collected from LGUs in 
two municipalities and the COs operating in two coastal and two lowland barangays in 








Qualitative and quantitative data used in this study were gathered from primary 
and secondary sources.  For the institutional adaptive capacity analysis, primary data 
were collected through key informant interviews (KII) and focus group discussions 
(FGD) using pretested questionnaires and interview guides. These involved regional, 
provincial, municipal, and barangay officials; experts in agriculture, health, engineering; 
and officers of selected COs.  
A total of 20 key informants were interviewed, and 11 FGDs were conducted with 
a total of 100 participants. These included barangay officials, members of local disaster 
coordinating councils, and some community residents who were affected by the typhoon 
(Table 1).  
Key informants from the LGUs were asked to rate their adaptive capacity using 
indicators. To verify and qualify the ratings, follow-up questions on the detailed activities 
that LGUs undertook were asked. The key informants‘ perceived performance as 
revealed by the rating and their response to the follow-up questions were analyzed and 
compared with the existing literature on adaptive capacity and adaptation strategies. The 
technical, institutional, social, and economic contexts within which the LGU community 
and COs operate were considered in the analysis. 
Table 1. Number of key informants interviewed and FGD participants, 2009 
Institution/Level No. of Key Informants Interviewed No. of FGD Participants 
Regional office  3 - 
Provincial office - 9 
Municipal office     14 21 
Barangay officials - 51 
Community organization 3 19 
Total 20 100 
Secondary data and information were collected from local government and 
disaster coordinating council reports. These included: socio-demographic and economic 
profiles, bio-physical and geographic characteristics, impacts experienced from typhoon 
(e.g., areas and population affected, extent of damage, revenue loss, costs of mitigation, 
and adaptation activities); adaptation strategies and reasons for adoption; and policies, 
programs, and response actions adopted by concerned institutions. 
Household data were collected through personal interview of households 
randomly chosen from the list provided by the barangays secretaries. The barangays were 
divided into several sitios or villages. The names of barangay residents were first grouped 
based on the location of their houses to ensure that all sitios would be represented. Using 
a table of random numbers, the sample respondents were drawn.  A total of 100 
respondents were drawn from each of the four barangays or a total of 200 respondents per 
municipality or 400 respondents in all the sites. The household data were analyzed using 
the SPSS program. 
Comparison of adaptive capacity between the two types of ecosystem involved 
calculation of adaptive capacity index. The individual variables for each indicator were 
aggregated to a parameter value, and these indicators values were aggregated into an 
overall index of adaptive capacity. This study adopted the normalization procedure 
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applied for the Human Development Index (HDI) by the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) (cited in Swanson et al. 2007) as shown in the following equations: 
 
indicators all of value Minimum - indicators all of value Maximum
indicators all of value Minimum -normalized be to indicator the of Value
value Normalized better) is higher (Where  
indicators all of value Minimum - indicators all of value Maximum
indicators all of value Minimum -normalized be to indicator the of Value
value Normalized better) is lower (Where 1  
 
Each variable within an adaptive capacity determinant (indicator) was considered 
to be of equal importance. Based on this assumed weighting, a single aggregated value 
for the indicator was calculated as the average of the normalized values of the different 
variables for each indicator. Each indicator was also considered to be of equal importance 
in calculating the overall adaptive capacity index for each area. Based on this assumed 
weighting, a single overall adaptive capacity index for each area was calculated as the 
average of the aggregated indicator values.   
Analysis of the adaptive capacity index for the indicators was taken from a 
relative perspective, i.e., ranking. The ranking relative to each other was helpful in 
identifying which areas appeared to be fairing well with respect to adaptive capacity. The 
scores were between 0 and 1 with 1 signifying that an area had the highest value for this 
indicator compared to all other areas. A score of 0 signified that the area had the lowest 
indicator value compared to all other areas.  
 To determine vulnerability of the households, impacts of typhoons were estimated 
based on costs of damage to household properties, production activities, livelihood 
sources, and health and safety. Adaptation strategies of households to deal with the 
climate event were classified as behavioral, structural, technological, and financial.  
Other adaptation possibilities not taken by the households and the barriers to adoption of 
other options were identified. These were identified to analyze adaptation gaps and to 
determine possible interventions for the improvement of the households‘ adaptive 
capacity and resilience to typhoons.  
2.3  Theoretical Framework  
 Adaptive capacity is the property of a system to adjust its characteristics or 
behavior in order to expand its coping range under existing climate variability or future 
climate conditions (Brooks and Adger 2005).  It is also described as its ―… ability to 
design and implement effective adaptation strategies, or to react to evolving hazards and 
stresses so as to reduce the likelihood of the occurrence and/or the magnitude of harmful 
outcomes resulting from climate-related hazards.‖ The adaptation process requires the 
capacity to learn from previous experiences to cope with current climate, and to apply 
these lessons to cope with future climate, including surprises.‖  Adaptive capacity can be 
expressed as actions that can lead to a system‘s adaptation, enhance its coping capacity, 
and increase its coping range – thereby, reducing its vulnerability to climate hazards.  
Adaptive capacity is influenced by certain key factors such as economic and 
natural resources, social networks, entitlements, institutions and governance, human 
resources, and technology (IPCC Working Group II, Fourth Assessment Report cited in 
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Adger et al. 2007). Stakeholder participation is also important in the development of 
local-level indicators of adaptive capacity because local people are generally the best 
equipped to identify factors that facilitate and constrain their own adaptation. At the 
household level, adaptive capacity indicators used in this study included infrastructure, 
economic, technology, social capital, and skills and knowledge. Households‘ 
endowments of these resources would bear on the impacts of climate hazards experienced 
by the households (Table 2). 
Table 2.  Indicators of households‘ adaptive capacity 
Indicator Indicator Variable Rationale 
Infrastructure -  House ownership 
-  Degree of permanence 
-  No. of storey 
-  Characteristics and location of infrastructure affect    
 adaptive capacity, i.e., permanent construction  
 materials enhance adaptive capacity. 




- Area and ownership of 
land (residential, farm) 
- Ownership of other assets 
(e.g., vehicle) 
- Household income and 
sources 
- Credit sources 
- Greater economic resources increase adaptive 
capacity. 
- Lack of financial resources limits adaptation options. 
- Greater financial assets mean more ability to recover 
from material loss. 
- Diverse employment opportunities provide more 
options if climate affects particular type of occupation. 
Technology - Availability and 
accessibility of shelter 
- Household willingness to 
evacuate to shelter 
- Sources of information on 
climate-related events  
- Lack of technology limits range of potential 
adaptation options. 
- Access to technology, e.g., shelter, information 
sources can enhance adaptive capacity.  
- Effective communications services guarantee faster 
response from within and without.  
- Greater access to information increases likelihood of 
timely and appropriate adaptation. 
Social capital - Membership in community 
organization 
- Sources and type of 
assistance available to 
households 
- Interaction in the 
community on climate-
related and other issues  
- Social/organization relations help reduce impacts of 
climate-related risks, and therefore increase adaptive 
capacity. 
- Community-based participation can enhance adaptive 
capacity. 
- Connections/networks facilitate information flow and 
may enhance community access to assistance. 
Skills and 
knowledge 
- Attendance in training in 
disaster preparedness 
- Knowledge gained and 
usefulness of training 
- Indigenous knowledge 
- Training and skill development can enhance adaptive 
capacity. 
- Greater access to information increases likelihood of 
timely and appropriate adaptation. 
Note: Adapted from Swanson et al. 2007 
 
Adaptation does not occur instantaneously. There are two types of adaptation: 
proactive and reactive (Burton et al. 2006). A proactive approach aims to reduce 
exposure to future risks, for instance, by avoiding development on flood-prone lands. A 
purely reactive approach aims only to alleviate impacts once these have occurred, for 
instance, by providing emergency assistance to flood victims. As a general rule, 
adaptation decisions should prioritize proactive actions to reduce future risk. However, 
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because significant risks remain, reactive approaches to help vulnerable populations 
recover from unavoidable impacts should also be provided. 
When a reactive response perpetuates or exacerbates exposure to climate risks, for 
instance, by assisting reconstruction in a flood-stricken area, it might be termed 
―maladaptation‖. Maladaptation is an action or process that increases vulnerability to 
climate change-related hazards. Maladaptive actions and processes often include planned 
development policies and measures that deliver short-term gains or economic benefits but 
lead to exacerbated vulnerability in the medium to long-term (UNDP 2009). 
The vulnerability or potential vulnerability of a system that is associated with 
anticipated hazards and future risk depends on its ability to institute appropriate long-
term adaptation measures. However, instantaneous vulnerability to hazards that may 
occur in the immediate future is related to a system‘s existing short-term coping capacity 
rather than its ability to pursue long-term adaptation strategies (Brooks and Adger 2005). 
In the literature, preparedness to address climate change impacts refers to a 
process of ensuring that an organization: 1) has complied with the preventive measures; 
2) is in a state of readiness to contain the effects of a forecasted disastrous event to 
minimize loss of life, injury, and damage to properties; 3) can provide rescue, relief, 
rehabilitation, and other services in the aftermath of the disaster; and 4) has the capability 
and resources to continue to sustain its essential functions without being overwhelmed by 
the demand placed on them. 
Some principles play an important role in defining emerging preparedness: 1) it is 
the responsibility of all; 2) it should be woven into the community and administrative 
context, and be undertaken at all administrative levels of both government and non-
government organizations; 3) it should not be done in isolation but integrated in the 
management system; and 4) it should not concentrate only on disasters but integrate 
prevention and response strategies for any scale of emergency (UNHCR and NDCC 
2003). 
A person‘s behavior towards all environmental issues is a result of the interaction 
of several factors. Environmentally-relevant behavior at a given time is affected most 
directly by: a) a person‘s emotions (concern, anger, shame) about the conditions of the 
environment; b) the expected benefits and/or costs of specific actions; c) his/her 
perceived ability to take specific types of actions; and d) his/her habits with respect to 
various actions (Patchen 2006). 
These variables are likely to be affected, in turn, by the person‘s appraisals of the 
situation (the seriousness of environmental problems, what others are doing, and the 
effectiveness of alternative actions). For example, a person who believes that climate 
change will bring flooding to his/her coastal city is likely to be fearful about this 
prospect, and therefore, will act accordingly (Patchen 2006). 
Global awareness of climate change has constantly increased, but this has not 
been translated to individual actions largely because people are confused over climate 
change causes and solutions. This ―green gap‖ in public attitudes partly stems from how 
climate science is communicated and how our minds‘ (mis)understand climate dynamics.  
The multi-stakeholder nature of adaptation to climate change implies that the solution 
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rests not on a single actor but is a concern of all affected sectors.  An added challenge to 
environmental behavior modification is how a person perceives the problem (Liverani 
2009). 
It has also been shown that understanding a problem does not always lead to 
action.  Knowledge is mediated through value systems shaped by psychological, cultural, 
and economic factors that determine whether we act or not. People are particularly good 
at acting upon threats that present themselves as unexpected, dramatic and immediate, 
rather than problems which emerge and develop slowly and gradually (Liverani 2009). In 
other words, people act upon threats that can be linked to a human face—that show 
obvious links to human health and that challenge our moral framework involving human 
action to  a recent personal experience.   The slow-changing quality of climate change, as 
well as the delayed, intangible, and statistical nature of its risks, simply do not ―move 
people‖.  
Behavioral economics shows that features of human decision making under 
uncertainty tend to constrain man‘s instinct to adapt.  Man generally favors the status quo 
and agree only to make small incremental adjustments to it, and strongly discount future 
events to assign higher priorities to spatially and temporally closer problems. For 
instance, the public tends to be mobilized by ―visible‖ environmental problems (urban air 
pollution) and not by less visible ones (groundwater pollution).  
  According to Liverani (2009), knowledge about climate change is not always 
expected to lead to action for several reasons: 1) people prioritize between a set of needs, 
and 2) people assess both the market and non-market implications of their decisions. 
Further, he said that the very act of ‗interpreting‘ or ‗mediating‘ adaptation needs is 
costly. To make rational decisions, individuals and communities facing adaptation 
choices incur transaction costs collecting and interpreting new and additional 
information. For a household having to decide whether to keep rebuilding on a flood-
prone area, these costs can be real and substantial. The same can be said for a local 
authority official in charge of designing and enforcing building codes in low-lying coastal 
areas.  
Policymakers need to be aware of these barriers to action and treat policy options 
accordingly. Three policy areas are relevant here: communications, institutional 
measures, and social norms. Well designed climate communication campaigns that 
address individuals as members of a local community—and not powerless members of an 
unmanageably large group—can empower them to act (Liverani 2009). 
Institutional measures. Beyond communication, a key question for climate policy 
is to design interventions that take into account psychological and social constraints to 
positive action. The design of effective adaptation interventions should include 
institutional measures reducing the transaction costs for individuals in making decisions 
while enhancing the ownership of the information available. This would require 
adaptation strategies to be informed by the communities‘ own perceptions of risk, 
vulnerability, and capacity. The institutionalization of participatory self-assessments for 
national and local disaster preparedness, adaptation planning, and mitigation targets can 
be useful in this (Liverani 2009). 
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Social norms. Social norms are established patterns of behavior that most people 
approve of—or the yardstick individuals use - to assess the appropriateness of their own 
behavior. As they shape human action, social norms can achieve socially desirable 
outcomes, generally at a fairly low cost. The basic idea is that individuals want to act in a 
socially acceptable way. We tend to follow the lead of others, particularly when the 
others are numerous and appear similar to them (Liverani 2009). 
Social norms have a particularly strong impact on recipients under conditions of 
uncertainty.  Rather than look for clues about how to behave when unsure about conduct 
and outcomes, people rely on what others do. Evidence from different environmental 
contexts shows that social norm-based appeals for pro-environmental behavior are 
superior to traditional persuasive appeals. The use of social norms has traditionally been 
neglected in public policy in favor of more standard measures, such as regulation, 
taxation, and pricing (Liverani 2009). 
 
3.0 PROFILE OF STUDY SITES, IMPACTS AND LOSSES 
3.1  Profile of Study Sites  
3.1.1  San Juan, Batangas 
The municipality of San Juan is located in the southern tip of Batangas province. 
It has a total land area of 27,340 ha, the second biggest municipality in the province of 
Batangas (Table 3). The town‘s population in 2007 was 87,276 and the total number of 
household was 20,314. Aside from farming, fishing was also a major industry in the 
municipality, with 16 coastal barangays depending on the industry for livelihood. The 
major crops planted were rice, corn, coconut, banana, mango, and various kinds of 
vegetables.  The study barangays in San Juan are Barangay Ticalan (located along the 
coast of Tayabas Bay) and Barangay Tipas, a lowland barangay, traversed by a big river 
system.  In 2007, Barangay Ticalan had a total land area of 459 ha and a population of 





Table  3. Profile of the study areas 
Item 
San Juan Tanauan City 




























Land area (ha) 27,340  459  197.878 10,716  220  216  
Physical feature Low flat 


















No. of barangays/ 
―sitio/puroks‖ 




87,276  1,773 2,867 142,537  5,461 1, 203 
 
Total number of  
households 


































Sources of data:  Annual Report of San Juan; Comprehensive Land Use of Tanauan City; Bgy. Socio-Economic Profile and Development Plan of 
Ambulong and  Altura Bata;  Tanauan City.   
 
3.1.2  Tanauan City, Batangas 
Tanauan City is strategically located near major growth centers such as Metro 
Manila and Batangas City, which have influenced its urbanization. It has a total land area 
of 10,716 ha with 48 barangays. A total of 142,537 residents and 21,912 households were 
living in the city as of 2007.  The major sources of livelihood were farming and fishing, 
while others were industrial and commercial activities.  
The study barangays in Tanauan City were Barangay Altura and Barangay 
Ambulong. Barangay Altura is a lowland barangay that is traversed by a big river and is 
located at the foot of Tagaytay Highlands.  It has a total land area of 216 ha and a total 
population of 1,203 in 239 households. Ambulong is a coastal barangay located along the 
coast of Taal Lake.  It is almost the same in size as Barangay Altura with 220 ha, but it 
was more densely populated in 2007 with 5,461 people.  
3.2  Impacts of Typhoon Milenyo in the Study Areas  
Typhoon Milenyo in 2006 brought an estimated damage of PhP6.6 billion 
(US$0.1375 billion) in the Philippines (NDCC n.d.). Batangas province was one of the 
provinces severely hit by Milenyo, affecting 34 municipalities and over 4,700 
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households.  Agriculture was the most severely affected representing 90 percent of the 
estimated total damage of PhP0.485 billion. 
3.2.1  Vulnerable areas and sectors 
The lowland and coastal ecozones in the two LGUs are said to be the most 
vulnerable to typhoons. Lowland barangays located along river systems and urban centers 
are exposed to flooding associated with typhoon and heavy rainfall.  Agricultural lands in 
upland and rainfed areas are also sensitive to climate variability and its associated water 
and temperature stress. Vulnerable areas are farmlands and settlement sites located in 
areas traversed by rivers and coastal barangays located along the shores of San Juan 
River and Taal Lake in Tanauan City.  These areas are quite sizeable considering the big 
river systems that traverse San Juan and Tanauan City.   
The geophysical condition of the two municipalities expose them to hydro-
meteorological-related hazards. Several river systems traverse the inland barangays, 
while the coastal barangays located along the shores of San Juan and Taal Lake in 
Tanauan City are exposed to heavy windstorm and storm surges. 
During Typhoon Milenyo, some lowland areas in San Juan and Tanauan City 
were flooded. Coastal barangays were exposed to windstorm. Strong winds damaged 
several houses, fishing boats, and fish pens in San Juan strong winds.   
The farmers, fisherfolks, and residents of low lying areas are considered as the 
most vulnerable sectors in both municipalities because their livelihood sources are very 
dependent and sensitive to climatological factors, particularly flooding.   
3.2.2  Losses incurred 
More than 90 percent of all barangays in both municipalities suffered damages 
from Typhoon Milenyo. Almost the same number of families was affected, the number of 
persons affected in San Juan is slightly higher. The number of partially damaged houses 
was almost the same but the number of totally damaged houses was higher in Tanauan 
City. Unfortunately, one person died in San Juan (Table 4).  Classes in San Juan were 
suspended for two days, and it took 1 to 14 days to restore electric power services in 
various parts of the town.   
 
Table 4.  Losses/damages incurred because of Typhoon Milenyo, San Juan and  
               Tanauan City, Batangas, 2006 
Item San Juan  Tanauan City 
No. of barangays affected 40 44 
No. of families affected 2,038 2,956 
No. of persons affected 10,635 12,174 
No. of dead persons 1 - 
No. of injured persons - 2 
No. of houses partially damaged 1,874 1,791 
No. of houses totally damaged 164 289 
No. of days classes were suspended 2 days - 
No. days electric power was disrupted 1-14 days - 




There is a wide difference in terms of total value of losses reported by the two 
LGUs (Table 5). The total value of losses incurred by San Juan is more than two times 
higher than that of Tanauan City. Agriculture suffered the most in both sites, particularly 
for rice, corn, fruits, and vegetable areas. Livestock accounted for the greatest value of 
losses in San Juan (USD250,000) while crop losses ranked first (USD228,274) in 
Tanauan City. Damage to infrastructure was reported only in San Juan.   
 
Table 5.  Estimated cost of damage brought by Typhoon Milenyo, 2006 
Item 
Cost of Damage 
San Juan Tanauan City 
PhP USD PhP USD 
Crops  10,402,957 216,728 10,957,178 228,274 
Livestock 12,000,000 250,000      420,000    8,750 
Infrastructure 3,000,000 62,500 - - 
Total 25,402,957 529,228 11,377,178 237,024 
Source: PDCC 
Note: Exchange rate: US$1 = PhP48  
In terms of land area and value of losses, banana was the most adversely affected 
by Typhoon Milenyo in San Juan (Table 6). A total of 804.5 ha of banana plantation was 
affected. About 30 percent of the expected yield with the total expected value of about 
PhP4.827 million (US$0.1006M) was lost.  
Losses to coconut farmers was relatively low at PhP253, 200 (US$5,275), but the 
long-term impact of the typhoon was quite significant.  Coconut flowers and young fruits 
are very sensitive and easily destroyed by strong winds, so it is not uncommon for the 
recovery period to last for two to three years.  In San Juan, coconut trees have not yet 
fully recovered since Typhoon Milenyo that hit the area three years ago. 
Huge losses were also incurred by many mango growers. However, recovery 
period for mango is relatively shorter than coconut and other fruit trees because mango 
flowering can be chemically-induced. 
Based on total value of losses and the necessary recovery period, the impact on 
vegetable farmers in both San Juan and Tanauan City appears small. But since vegetable 
farming is a supplementary livelihood source for the small farmers in both municipalities, 
its poverty impact was quite significant. 
Typhoon Milenyo also threatened the food security base of San Juan. About 148 
ha of rice lands operated by about 100 farmers were affected.  Fortunately, some of the 
rice plants were able to recover and only 30 percent of the expected yield with an 
expected value of about PhP606, 370 (US$12,633) was lost.  
In Tanauan City, orchard growers and corn farmers suffered the highest value of 
losses  from the typhoon.  A total of 271 vegetable and 66 corn farmers reported total 
damages of about  PhP796,500 (US$16,594) and PhP481,518 (US$10,032), respectively. 
The socio-economic implications to corn farmers are enormous because they plant only 
one crop per year on rainfed farms. Vegetable farming is a supplementary income source.  
Hence, corn farmers have to wait for the next rainy season to be able to resume their 
farming operations.  
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Table 6. Estimated value of crop losses because of Typhoon Milenyo, San Juan and Tanauan City, Batangas 2006 
Crop 















Rice -- 148 30 606,370 (US$12,633) 23 23.5 20 64,187 (US$1,337) 
Coconut -- 21 -- 253,200 (US$5,275) -- -- -- -- 
Rambutan -- -- -- -- 38 14 80 560,000 (US$11,667) 
Mango -- 5.25 100 105,000 (US$2,188) 98 42.5 80 748,000 (US$15,583) 
Tamarind -- 20 30 129,000 (US$2,687) -- -- -- -- 
Lanzones -- -- -- -- 17 60.5 80 2.42M (US$0.0504 million) 




jack fruit, and 
papaya) 




Notes: 100% of all planted areas were affected but with chances of recovery except the mango areas.  




4.0   ADAPTIVE CAPACITY AND ADAPTATION STRATEGIES OF LOCAL  
  CRM INSTITUTIONS 
 
4.1  Adaptive Capacity of Local Institutions  
The indicators used to assess adaptive capacity of LGUs were the following: 
a) institutions and governance; b) risk assessment, monitoring, and warning; c) 
knowledge, education, and information; d) climate change adaptation technology and 
infrastructure; and e) underlying risk factors.  
The local government officials involved in DRM were asked to assess the 
LGUs‘ adaptive capacity to climate change impacts.  The staff of the Provincial 
Assistance for Community Development (PACD) were also asked to rate the adaptive 
capacity of the LGUs in the study municipalities. Not surprisingly, the municipal 
officials ranked themselves high (i.e., 4 or 5) in many aspects, not because they 
wanted to simply project a good image but because they perceived themselves to have 
high adaptive capacity based on their appreciation of appropriate response actions.  
On the other hand, the PACD staff who have greater exposure to DRM protocols 
generally gave the two LGUs lower adaptive capacity rating. 
4.1.1  Institutions and governance  
The institutions‘ governance capability was assessed using several indicators, 
namely: frameworks and structures, programs and policies, financial capability and 
human resource capability.  
San Juan‘s rating of its capacity indicator of institutions and governance was 
relatively higher than that of Tanauan City. Key informants of San Juan rated their 
adaptive capacity from 4 to 5, while those in Tanauan City rated theirs from 3 to 4.  
San Juan respondents recognized that they have some limitations in frameworks and 
structures; effectiveness of organizations in performing their tasks, programs and 
policies; and human resources. However, they believed that they have adequate 
financial capability as well as satisfactory, sustainable, and effective resource 
generation measures in place.  
On the other hand, key informants in Tanauan believed that their frameworks 
and structures, financial capability, and human resource capability were satisfactory, 
although with some limitations (rating= 4).  They recognized that while they might 
have some CRM programs and policies, they needed to improve their responsiveness. 
The PACD staff also recognized that the CRM frameworks and structures in the two 
municipalities were quite effective, but they still have serious limitations in terms of 




Figure 2.     Adaptive capacity rating of LGUs in terms of institutions and    
                    governance  
 
4.1.1.1 Frameworks and structures for disaster risk  management  
The Philippines has a set of well established disaster risk management 
procedures and structures, which involve all levels of government and all relevant 
government agencies. Disaster risk management is said to be a priority concern of the 
LGUs, which gave them a general perception that they have effective frameworks and 
structures. However, some conceptual and operational issues have to be clarified 
before these LGUs can effectively respond to climate change-related events.  
The key informants in San Juan and Tanauan City rated themselves high in 
frameworks and structures for disaster risk management (Figure 3).  They have an 
organization within the LGU that effectively discharged DRM functions and 
responded to CRM concerns. These organizations called the local disaster 
coordinating councils (LDCCs) used a DRM manual issued by the Office of Civil 
Defense (OCD) as a guide in responding to all types of disasters.   
 
 
Figure 3. Adaptive capacity rating of LGUs‘ frameworks and structures 
 
The fundamental basis for DRM in the Philippines is outlined in Presidential 
Decree (PD) 1566 (1978), which aims to ―strengthen the Philippines‘ disaster control 
capability‖ and establish the National Program on Community Disaster Preparedness. 
PD 1566 mandated the creation of disaster coordinating councils at all government 
levels (national, regional, provincial, municipal/city, and barangay). The National 
Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) is chaired by the Secretary of National 
Defense, while the OCD Administrator serves as its Executive Officer.  Eighteen 
major government departments represented by the department secretaries, are 
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designated as NDCC members, and they perform functions related to their mandates 
and sectoral concerns.   
The salient features of PD No. 1566 are as follows: 
1. Promotion of self-reliance and mutual assistance among local officials and 
their constituents  
2. Emphasis on disaster preparedness 
3. Organization of the national, regional, provincial, municipal/city, and 
barangay DCCs 
4. Mobilization of all government agencies and delegation of disaster 
response leadership through local government authorities 
5. Conduct of periodic drills and exercises by concerned agencies/DCCs 
6. Authorization of LGUs to program funds for disaster preparedness 
activities 
7. Preparation and updating of a National Disaster and Calamities 
Preparedness Plan  
8. Documentation of disaster preparedness plans at all government levels 
In compliance with PD 1566, both San Juan and Tanauan City have organized 
their respective LDCCs. The Municipal/City Mayor serves as the LDCC Chair 
assisted by the Chief of Police assigned in the Municipality/City as his deputy. The 
chief of the municipal/city social welfare department is deputized as City Disaster 
Coordinating Council (CDCC) Coordinator and his/her office is used as the operations 
center during disasters. All organic municipal officials, as well as all national officials 
working at the municipal level are members of the local DCCs.  
The disaster operation center in both San Juan and Tanauan City was housed 
under the local Social Welfare and Development Office (SWDO). The local SWD 
officer was deputized as LDCC Coordinator and assisted by the other LGU 
departments. This organizational structure indicates that the LGU‘s response action is 
primarily reactive and oriented for relief and rescue rather than proactive and oriented 
for preparedness. Some of the LGU staff, including the barangay coordinating 
councils, have attended a training related to disaster management.  
All the personnel who worked on DRM activities were full-time staff members 
of the various LGU departments, but they were seconded to the LDCC to perform 
DRM functions in times of calamities. The Tanauan City SWDO has suggested the 
creation of a disaster operations center as a separate unit and the appointment of a 
full-time DRM officer. However, the local legislative body has not yet acted on this 
recommendation. 
The social/organizational network of an LGU also indicates how it links with 
other possible partners in addressing climate change. LDCC is composed of 10 task 
units, which include: 1) communication and warning; 2) transportation; 3) evacuation; 
4) rescue and engineering; 5) health; 6) fire; 7) police; 8) relief; 9) rehabilitation; and 
10) public information. Other social and civic organizations, non-government 
organizations, and the private sector also assisted the LDCCs in times of disaster. The 
LDCC has supervisory power over the BDCC and reported to the PDCC about the 
nature and extent of typhoon damages within their political jurisdiction.   
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 Effectiveness of Organizations  
The key informants generally believed that the LDCCs were effective in 
performing their tasks. They rated the LDCCs high (4) although these still had 
limitations in capacities and resources. Accordingly, the councils had enough funds to 
provide relief to affected population and to inform the public about the impending 
typhoon. The LDCC were able to mobilize all the LGU personnel to respond to 
emergencies, set up evacuation centers, and stock up relief goods for the evacuees.  
In San Juan, the factors that enhanced the LDCCs‘ effectiveness were 
adequate funds; skilled manpower; full administrative support from the LGU; and 
good coordination between teams/units.  In Tanauan City, adequate funds enhanced 
the LDCCs‘ effectiveness, while the PACD staff considered good community 
cooperation and coordination between teams/units as enhancing factors, which 
facilitated disaster information dissemination, timely evacuation, and minimal 
casualties and damage to properties.  
The factors that constrained the effectiveness of San Juan‘s DCC was the lack 
of equipment for risk monitoring and relief operations.  Key informants from Tanauan 
City, on the other hand, pointed to the lack of coordination between the tasks units as 
their major constraint. In Tanauan, key informants from PACD likewise considered 
lack of funds and inadequate preparedness against strong typhoons like Milenyo as 
the LGUs‘ major constraints.  
4.1.1.2 Programs and policies 
Key informants from Tanauan City rated their programs and policies low (3) 
because adaptation to climate change-related event has not yet been incorporated in 
their overall planning. For instance, some of the institutional changes recommended 
by the deputized DRM officer regarding the creation of a distinct DRM office with 
full-time staff and budget to prepare DRM plans have not yet been approved by the 
local legislature.  They also believed that much should still be done in formulating and 
implementing appropriate DRM programs, such as the relocation of people living in 
river banks and the enforcement of a building code.  
Key respondents from San Juan gave a relatively higher rating (4), indicating 
that adaptation programs have already been integrated in their development plan. 
However, this perception was countered by the key informants from the PACD who 
believed that integration was quite limited in both LGUs (Figure 4).  
 
 




Republic Act (RA) No. 7160 of 1991, also known as the Local Government 
Code, is one of the legal bases of the LGUs in utilizing funds related to natural 
calamities such as typhoon. This code stipulates that the LGUs shall set aside 5 
percent of the estimated revenue from regular sources as annual lump sum 
appropriation for unforeseen expenditures resulting from calamities in areas declared 
by the President in a state of calamity. This implies that Calamity Fund release can be 
authorized only if the President has declared an area/city/municipality under calamity 
based on certain criteria, one of which is the extent of damage. The authority to 
declare the ―state of calamity‖ was transferred from the President to the local 
legislature by virtue of RA 8185 of 1996, which in effect empowered the LGU to act 
or respond immediately.  Thus, resource mobilization, particularly those that will 
require budget disbursement, was facilitated.  
On March 20, 2003, joint Department of Budget and Management (DBM)-
DILG Memorandum Circular No. 2003-1 was issued allowing the use of local 
―calamity fund‖ for disaster preparedness and other pre-disaster activities provided 
that the Sanggunian shall declare an imminent danger of calamity. This implies that 
the calamity fund could be used not only after a climate disaster event but also for 
pre-disaster or ‗preparedness‘ activities such as training and information, education, 
and communication (IEC) campaigns.  However, LGUs were hesitant to use the 
Calamity Fund for disaster preparedness for fear that they may be charged with 
technical malversation.  Some state auditors believed that disaster preparedness was 
not identified in RA 7160 and that another law had to be passed revising the specific 
provisions of RA 7160 because an executive order could not repeal a law. 
  LGUs have crafted a Disaster Management Plan (DMP), also in compliance 
with PD 1566 that was consistent with the Batangas Provincial Disaster Preparedness 
and Mitigation Manual. The manual contains the duties and responsibilities of the 
DCC members, the principles and guidelines for disaster management approaches, 
and the procedures for contingency planning.  
The LGUs also have prepared the Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) that 
should guide local development planning and take CRM into consideration. Further, 
the LGUs have crafted the Building Code to regulate the construction of 
infrastructure, houses, and buildings and to ensure building safety and standards.  This 
code had to be strictly enforced, particularly in flood-prone areas to mitigate potential 
losses and damages. 
Other DRM programs concerned IEC in order to raise the awareness and 
improve the response capability not only of the LDCC members but also of the 
community. 
Recognizing the urgency to lay down CRM procedures, the Department of 
Interior and Local Government (DILG) issued memorandum circulars to raise climate 
change awareness and enhance the CRM capability of LGUs.  
4.1.1.3 Financial resources 
The key informants rated their LGU‘s financial capability as high.  San Juan 
respondents believed that satisfactory, sustainable, and effective measures were 
already in place to ensure their financial capability for DRM. San Juan was able to 
meet its financial requirements in 2006 even though four typhoons hit the 
municipality. Tanauan City respondents had a slightly lower rating (4) because they 
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perceived some limitations in capacities and resources (Figure 5).  For instance, they 
encountered some financial problems in responding to Typhoon Milenyo. Key 
informants from the PACD also rated Tanauan City‘s financial capability as low (2).  
 
 
Figure 5. Adaptive capacity rating of LGUs‘ in terms of financial resources 
 
Institutional measures have been set up to enable the LGUs to access 
additional calamity fund from internal and external sources.  When the LGUs‘ 
Calamity Funds have been used up, the local legislative body had the authority to 
allocate supplemental budget. The LGU could also request the provincial and national 
governments for additional financial assistance to augment their own Calamity Fund. 
4.1.1.4 Human resources 
The PACD supports LGUs in the enhancement of human resource capability.  
Both San Juan and Tanauan City key informants rated their LGUs high (4) in this 
aspect (Figure 6).  Each of the LGUs had 10 task units, each of which was composed 
of three personnel who could be mobilized to perform DRM activities. In addition, the 
BDCC with its full complement of barangay councilors and police, were also 
mobilized to disseminate information and help in evacuation and relief operations.   
 
 
Figure 6. Adaptive capacity rating in terms of human resource capability 
 
However, the level of awareness and technical skills of the LDCC members 
and that of the community were quite low. Of the 64 LDCC members, only 10 or 15.6 
percent have attended DRM seminars.  Six San Juan DCC staff attended a three-day 
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seminar on disaster management conducted in Malaysia and a climate change 
awareness-raising seminar conducted by UPLB (Figure 7). On the other hand, two 
Tanauan City DCC and two PACD staff attended a disaster preparedness training 
conducted by NDCC, RDCC ,and PDCC. Tanauan City SWDO, in turn, conducted 
DRM seminars on disaster preparedness and management and disaster response action 



















Figure 7. Proportion of LDCC staff who have attended a DRM seminar 
 
 
4.1.2  Risk assessment, monitoring, and warning  
Key informants again differed in rating their capability in risk assessment, 
monitoring, and warning (Figure 8). They rated San Juan relatively higher (4) than 
Tanauan City (3), while key informants from PACD maintained the low rating (2) of 
the LGUs.  Not one of the LGU had a hazard map or a localized risk monitoring 
system to determine vulnerable areas and the necessary adaptation strategies and 
adaptive capacity that should be enhanced.   
The LGU of San Juan claimed to have effective early warning systems in 
place and to have carried out climate change-related risk assessments.  Their only 
limitation, according to the key informants was that they still needed to enhance their 
risk management systems to regularly monitor hazards and risks.  These claims, 
however, were not supported by documentary evidence. The LGU had no hazard map, 
and its early warning system consisted of typhoon warnings using information from 
the mass media.  
On the other hand, the LGU of Tanauan City reported serious constraints in all 
the three components of this adaptive capacity indicator. The key informants were 
aware of the vulnerable areas and sectors in their municipality, but based merely on 
past experiences.  Further, these information were collected only as supporting 
documents for auditing calamity fund disbursement and not systematically 
documented and stored. Report on the sectors affected and value of losses/damages 
caused by Typhoon Milenyo, for example, were stored in the LGUs‘ store room and 






Figure 8. Risk assessment, monitoring, and warning capability of LGUs 
 
The LGUs also had limited access to climatological and hydrometeorological 
data and information.  For instance, while the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical, 
and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) has a synoptic station in 
Tanauan City, weather observations (atmospheric pressure, wind direction and speed, 
air temperature, humidity, clouds, precipitation) were transmitted to the central office 
in Manila for analysis and interpretation. These observations were not directly 
available to the LGU. Hence, it was still the central office that announced and issued 
weather forecast bulletins. 
PAGASA also issued flood warning signals and information as well as flood 
bulletins to various government agencies.  However, the agency monitored flood in 
only four major river systems that feed into major multi-purpose dams and water 
storage facilities. The river systems in the study areas were not among those 
monitored by PAGASA.  
The LGUs monitored the progress of the Typhoon Milenyo by listening to the 
radio, by watching television, and by getting information from the PDCC. They then 
warned the population at risk through a public address system. They literally warned 
people about the possible threats of the typhoon and the need to take precautionary 
measures, particularly going to evacuation centers. Warning system and monitoring 
were done using off-road vehicles to reach the different barangays. As part of their 
risk monitoring activity, the LDCCs held monthly meetings and communicated 
regularly with the BDCCs. 
The local government of San Juan claimed that it keeps a database on climate-
related impacts and a list of indigent/vulnerable families. These families included  
farmers, senior citizens, fisherfolks, and children who were vulnerable because of 
their geographic location and poverty. In Tanauan City, the vulnerable sectors 
included children, the elderly, and people living in river banks. 
Both municipalities reported having a database system that contained 
information on crop losses and damages, areas affected, population affected, 
casualties, and houses damaged. However, these information were not systematically 
stored and easily retrievable.  For instance, records of Typhoon Milenyo were already 
stored in stockrooms, and the office concerned (e.g., social welfare department) did 
not keep its own copy of such records.  
Technically, risk assessment would require information on the vulnerable 
areas and sectors based on a scientific vulnerability assessment. Moreover, monitoring 
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should not only focus on intensity of typhoon based on national forecast but on the 
potential impact of the event on the locality. Risk assessment could be done by 
measuring and monitoring the amount of rainfall that the locality has received and the 
consequent flooding from this rainfall. Further, monitoring should extend beyond the 
number of people that are affected by the typhoon. More importantly, other factors 
that should be monitored such as the decision points, i.e. when to start evacuation 
because of possible flooding; what is the expected flood level; and how this 
information can be communicated to all concerned. These information could become 
available only if an early warning system had been established. 
The warning signal should be understood by the community. The warning 
should be based on a long-term study of the impacts of typhoons, the areas exposed or 
sensitive to typhoons and flooding, and the adaptive capacity of the effected sectors.    
However, there were no localized information on critical hydro-meteorological 
variables such as rainfall and flooding. Moreover, the LDCC could not accurately 
predict which areas would be severely affected by the typhoon. Because of the lack of 
localized information, many past predictions of typhoon impacts did not materialize. 
As a consequence, the community residents have doubted the reliability of national 
forecast and evacuation warnings by LGU officials. As a consequence, in recent 
years, the people would wait for visual signs of danger (e.g., flood waters rising) 
before they would respond to evacuation warnings. 
The LDCCs in both LGUs have not actually conducted any training on 
adaptation to climate change-related events but on disaster risk management for 
BDCC and other LDCC members. While this training was open to all members of 
local communities, including the most vulnerable groups, very few of them actually 
attended such training.  
4.1.3  Knowledge, education, and information system  
San Juan again got a relatively higher rating than Tanauan City in knowledge, 
education, and information system. Both municipalities claimed that they had 
information on how to reduce and respond to climate change-related risks that were 
readily available and accessible to key stakeholders. They had community-based 
training on climate change-related risks and adaptation open to all members of the 
local communities but with limitations in capacities and resources (Figure 9).  
San Juan had the same rating in public education initiatives or the sharing of 
information about climate change-related risks to communities. Tanauan City, which 
had not done much on this aspect, rated itself relatively low.  The PACD staff gave 





Figure 9. Knowledge, education, and information programs of LGUs 
 
Information on climate change-related risks and how to both reduce and 
respond to them at the national level were readily available and accessible to key 
stakeholders including government officials, general public, private sector, and local 
leaders in affected communities.  The information on typhoon intensity and general 
direction were provided by PAGASA and broadcasted in national television and radio 
stations regularly. Typhoon bulletins were issued by PAGASA four times a day 
during typhoon events. LGU officials and the general public sourced their information 
about the typhoon from these media, although the LDCC also got regular updates 
from the PDCC and RDCC.  
Other than the attempt of San Juan‘s SWDO to conduct a DRM information 
lecture to elementary students and to hold an art contest on DRM, there was no public 
education initiative to inform communities about the risks, exposure reduction, 
protection, and response to climate change-related disasters.   
The progress of the typhoon, including the extent of affected areas and 
population, were monitored by the LDCC through constant communication with the 
PDCC and the BDCC.  Reports of damages were transmitted from the BDCC to the 
LDCC and PDCC, which in turn, transmitted the report to the RDCC and NDCC.      
As mentioned above, the LDCCs and the communities relied on national 
media for information on typhoons. The LDCCs then mobilized the PNP and the 
barangay police to disseminate such information to the villagers. The information 
commonly transmitted referred to the typhoon intensity and the need for those living 
in flood-prone areas to take precautionary measures and evacuate to safer grounds.  
However, people usually doubted the accuracy of such warnings because oftentimes, 
the national level forecast had little relevance to local conditions.  LGUs have to 
prepare a localized early warning system that would reflect local physical impacts 
(e.g., flooding) of climatic events that are national in scope. 
 Tanauan City conducted information dissemination on disaster and 
contingency planning.  However, the lecture materials were quite limited in scope and 
were not very informative.  These barely described disaster preparedness, and the 
illustrations focused on landslide, which was less frequent than a typhoon or flooding.  
Attendance of community residents to seminars was low and the effectiveness of the 
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seminars has not been evaluated. Some BDCC members and BDCC chairs have not 
yet attended such seminar/training. The seminar/training on disaster risk management 
has been stopped in San Juan after only one session.  
Knowledge and information are critical decision-making inputs.  Accurate, 
concrete, and adequate information are essential for policymakers and affected 
individuals for them to make timely and appropriate decisions.  In CRM, decisions are 
based not only on the current situation but on time-series data that indicate the extent 
of a typhoon‘s impact with its windstorm and rainfall. Also important are information 
on the areas and sectors that may be affected and the possible adaptation options for 
such a typhoon‘s intensity.  
4.1.4  Climate change adaptation technology and infrastructure 
Technologies for disaster risk management are related to risk monitoring and 
warning, communication, and transportation. Risk monitoring and warning 
technology refers to rain gauge, flood indicator, and information dissemination 
instruments.  Communication devices include landline phone and fax, mobile phone, 
two-way radio, and internet. LGUs have fire trucks, a dump truck, and service vehicle 
for information dissemination, evacuation, and rescue and relief operations.  
Moreover, LGUs have generators to provide electricity to the LGU offices and other 
service-oriented areas such as the public market as well as equipment (e.g., grader) for 
clearing operations.   
This finding indicates that San Juan and Tanauan City were not yet conscious 
of the technology and infrastructure requirement to address typhoon-induced impacts.  
Both LGUs did not have a rain gauge or a flood indicator device, and they did not 
consider these instruments as priorities. There was a PAGASA synoptic station in one 
of the barangays in Tanauan City, but there was no instituted mechanism by which 
data generated by the station could be used by the LGU. Both LGUs believed that 
they were not vulnerable to climate change-induced events even if flooding and 
windstorms have caused severe damages to their people and livelihood. 
Technology would have been useful in risk assessment, monitoring, and 
warning. However, the LDCC‘s recognition of their technology needs depended on 
their appreciation of the risks and necessary adaptation measures. Lack of additional 
technological requirements to enhance LGUs‘ adaptive capacity reflected their low 
level of appreciation for technology. 
4.1.5 Underlying risk factors 
On average, the three groups of key informants agreed that addressing the 
underlying risk factors must be significantly improved. However, their opinion varied 
considerably as to the status of their LGU‘s efforts along this line. For instance, San 
Juan LGU was reportedly effective in their protection of critical public facilities 
against major hazards, in their adaptation to climate change, and in planning land use.  
On the other hand, the LGU of Tanauan City rated itself relatively high (4) on various 
social aspects, low (3) in environmental concerns, and very low (2) in its capability to 










City PACD Average 
Local policies support environmental and natural 
resource management.  
3 3 3 
3 
LGU supports communities to adapt to climate 
change. 
3 4 3 
3.33 
LGU strengthens food security in vulnerable 
communities. 
3 4 3 
3.33 
Social protection is available to vulnerable groups. 3 4 3 3.33 
LGU provides economic protection against unsafe 
livelihoods. 
3 4 3 
3.33 
Land use planning incorporates adaptation to climate 
change. 
4 3 2 
3 
Urban planning includes issues of informal settling 
in vulnerable areas. 
3 3 3 
3 
Overall planning addresses climate change 
adaptation. 
4 3 4 
3.67 
Building codes and standards are applicable to 
informal settlers. 
3 2 3 
2.67 
LGU has the capacity to implement building codes 
and standards.  
3 2 4 
3 
There is protection of critical public facilities against 
major hazard threats. 
5 4 3 
4 
LGU initiates public-private partnerships in climate 
change  adaptation. 
3 4 2 
3 
The LGUs‘ concerns to reduce climate change-related risks may be expressed 
through other local initiatives, such as the protection of environment and natural 
resources; socio-economic measures to improve the communities‘ social and 
economic resilience; and public-private partnership. In the study areas, these were 
addressed in the CLUP; in the local Building Code in order to ensure safety of 
infrastructure; and in the Solid Waste Management Program to abate the problem of 
flooding.  
To address the squatters‘ problem, Tanauan City also designated areas for 
socialized housing where river bank residents could be relocated. Through seed 
distribution program, food stock, and livelihood training programs, food security was 
also been addressed. Tanauan City also had a crop insurance system with the farmers, 
which was executed through a Memorandum of Agreement between the LGU and the 
farmer. As discussed earlier, the LGUs were able to harness the participation of the 
private and business sectors in climate-event related activities.  
Despite the LGUs‘ mitigation and adaptation efforts, however, development in 
surrounding municipalities and provinces may exacerbate climate change impact on 
the study barangays. For instance, the settlement development in Tagaytay Highlands 
has allegedly caused increased surface run-off and flooding that adversely affected the 




4.2   Adaptation Strategies of Local Institutions Pre, During and Post-Typhoon  
 Milenyo 
4.2.1  Adaptation strategies done by Local Government Units for 
Typhoon Milenyo 
The adaptation strategies of the two LGUs before and during the typhoon were 
basically the same because they carried out activities in accordance with the DRM 
manual and the established protocol.  
The strategies are classified as structural, technological, financial, behavioral, 
and institutional (Table 8).  Expectedly, most strategies before, during, and after 
Typhoon Milenyo were institutional as the LGUs mobilized the resources needed and 
spearheaded the activities undertaken.  
Pre-disaster activities of the LDCC included the following:  
1. emergency LDCC meeting to assess the  level of preparedness of various 
LDCC committees to meet any emergency situation and assist the public; 
2. preparedness of ensuring medical and food supplies, evacuation centers, 
and rescue equipment; 
3. informing people about the impending event and warning them to evacuate 
to safer places; and  
4. ensuring that all LDCC members were at the DOC to monitor the progress 
of the event and to provide the necessary assistance 
During the events, LDCC members were required to report to the DOC and 
respond to any emergency. However, there was very little they could do beyond 
monitoring the progress of Typhoon Milenyo because of the strong winds.  Rescue of 
residents in flooded areas was made possible during the lull but had to suspend 
operations when strong winds hit again.  
The post-Typhoon Milenyo activities of the LDCCs were focused on the 
rehabilitation of damaged public infrastructures and provision of assistance to 
facilitate the recovery of affected community residents. LDCC tasks units inspected 
affected areas and estimated damages and monitored the incidence of diseases and 
casualties (injuries and death) in the communities and hospitals. Because of the extent 
of damage in San Juan, the local legislature declared the municipality in a state of 
calamity. Post-disaster activities were mainly relief operations for displaced residents 
and rehabilitation of damaged properties. 
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Table 8.  Adaptation strategies done by LGUs for Typhoon Milenyo, 2006  




- Set up/checked evacuation centers 
- Checked if the Rural Health Units were ready 
- Prepared rescue equipment  
- Inventoried resources such as transport for relief operations 
- Inventoried medicine and emergency supplies  
- Stockpiled basic necessities  
- Mobilized City/BDCC  
- Monitored  progress of typhoons from PAGASA and media 
- Conducted Disaster Operation Seminar 
- Announced warning signals   
- Made an initial report on standing crop and livestock 
- Held meeting of health unit and social welfare staff  
- Prepared report forms 





- Stood by and monitored weather situation and conditions in the community 
- DCCs inspected and monitored flood-prone areas 
- Evacuated residents  affected by flood 
- Submitted reports to higher authorities, e.g., PDCC 
Post-Typhoon 
Milenyo 
- Evaluated situation in evacuation centers 
- Repaired public physical facilities  
- Conducted clearing activities 
- Provided construction materials (such as galvanized iron sheets) for house repair  
- Provided fishing nets to fisherfolks  
- Implemented Self-employment Assistance Program  
- Provided financial assistance  
- Assessed crop damages and paid crop insurance 
- Distributed pails (donated by the Regional Social Welfare and Development 
office) 
- Distributed relief goods  
- Provided livelihood assistance 
- Inspected affected areas and estimated damages 
- Monitored incidence of diseases, injured people, sanitation situation in the    
  community, hospitals 
- Local council declared the area under a state of calamity 
Both LGUs provided financial assistance of PhP2,000 (US$41) to PhP5,000  
(US$104) in the form of building materials to those whose houses were damaged by 
the typhoon, depending on the extent of damage. Starter seeds were also provided to 
farmers whose crops were damaged. Additional help from other groups and 
individuals were also distributed by the offices concerned to the different sectors.  For 
instance, the congressman from San Juan donated PhP12,000 (US$250) worth of 
seeds and PhP200,000 (US$4,166) in cash for affected families.    
In Tanauan City, the LGU implemented a Self-employment Assistance 
Program. Ten families with sari-sari stores (small variety stores) were loaned 
PhP5,000 (US$104) each, to be paid within one year. A total of 50 families were also 
given financial assistance amounting to PhP1,000 (US$20) per family. Overall, the 
LGU spent about PhP800,000 (US$16,666) for the various relief, rescue, and 
rehabilitation activities in connection with Typhoon Milenyo.  
The LGUs were able to resume normal functions within one week after 
Typhoon Milenyo. This was because the availability of calamity fund enabled the 
LGUs to procure necessary rehabilitation materials, provide financial support, and 
allocate funds for rehabilitation. The systems and procedures for restoring damaged 
30 
 
facilities and utility services were in place. Further, the community residents already 
knew how to seek support for relief and rehabilitation from the LGU. The evacuees in 
Tanauan City stayed in the schools, which were converted to evacuation centers for 
only one day; classes resumed after the typhoon signal was lowered. Electric power 
and water supply were also restored immediately after the typhoon. However, the 
recovery period for the affected families varied considerably depending on the extent 
of the typhoon‘s impact and their level of resilience. 
4.2.2 Adaptation strategies that the LGUs planned to do/recommended  
As mandated in PD 1566, LGUs are to prepare a DRM program that outlines 
the LDCCs activities before, during, and after a disaster. These adaptation strategies 
practiced by the LGUs should follow the ―Preparedness – Prevention – Mitigation‖ 
pattern as illustrated in Figure 10.  This is in accordance with the DRM manual and 
the established protocol. This also explains why the adaptation strategies of the LGUs 














Figure 10.  Pattern of adaptation strategies recommended to be pursued in  
                             the study sites 
                 Source: Batangas PDCC 
A. Pre-disaster 
  The pattern above indicates that LDCCs are required to determine the 
vulnerable sectors and identify possible adaptation options based on the community 
profile that will be generated.  Also, based on these data, accessible evacuation 
centers are to be identified. Preparedness also refers to the LDCC‘s readiness to 
respond to an emergency situation. 
The municipalities/communities are expected to maintain a stock of rice, 
instant noodles, canned fish, and other relief goods for emergencies. These goods are 
to be distributed to those staying in evacuation centers during the typhoon and 
sometimes even immediately after the typhoon.  
B. During Disasters 
1. activate disaster operation center  
2. ensure that the disaster operation center is manned for 24 hours 
3. monitor typhoon warning signals issued by PAGASA  





5. alert  the various committees to report to the disaster operation center  
6. advise the public of what the LDCC is doing and where to get assistance  
7. provide transportation facilities to the evacuees 
8. keep all communication lines open and inform authorities of the local situation 
9. receive reports and coordinate the works of the different committees 
10. survey the affected areas and report to the LDCC chair 
11. provide emergency relief and medical assistance 
12. regularly update the LDCC chair and the PDCC about the situation in affected 
areas  
13. make sure that all committees are provided necessary support and are doing 
their tasks and that all victims and donation are properly documented. 
C. Post- disaster 
1. undertake damage control 
2. monitor the incidence of diseases and casualties (injured and dead) 
3. locate missing persons  
4. undertake relief and rehabilitation services 
5. assess and estimate damages 
6. perform continuous monitoring and reporting 
7. prepare final report after operations 
The LGUs were confident that they undertook the appropriate responses, 
particularly because these actions were in accordance with the DRM Manual.  Hence, 
they would follow the same procedures and undertake the same activities for similar 
events in the future.  However, they were hoping for improvements such as additional 
manpower, a full-time DRM office, and additional equipment so as not to over burden 
the LGU staff during and after an extreme typhoon event.  
4.2.3  Gaps and weaknesses in the LGUs’ adaptation to Typhoon 
Milenyo 
With their long years of dealing with typhoon and flooding and of applying 
DRM protocols, the LGU key informants felt confident that their current adaptive 
capacity and adaptation strategies were adequate and effective to address climate-
related incidents. Viewed in the context of CRM and the preparedness principles that 
should guide their disaster preparedness and planning, these are some gaps and 
weaknesses in the LGUs‘ response to Typhoon Milenyo: 
1. Stakeholders‘ misperception about climate change phenomena and the 
associated climate risk.  
Stakeholders have to understand that climate change is unequivocal and that 
typhoons with increasing intensity will be a recurring event. Hence, 




2. Stakeholders‘ misconception about the principles of adaptation and response 
to climate change, which have implications on the nature and scope of their 
response.   
According to Burton et al. (2006), climate change adaptation should be long-
term.  It should be pro-active to avoid the recurrence of disaster and to prevent 
climate risk from turning into a disaster.  The ultimate goal of an effective 
adaptation strategy is to help populations at risk to enhance and develop a 
higher level of resilience. 
3. Misconception about some of the crucial elements of disaster preparedness 
such as risk assessment and early warning system.  
An effective risk management strategy should have a sound scientific basis 
and should provide policy and decision makers with concrete decision criteria.  
An early warning system should inform and empower people to make 
independent decisions based on warning signals that are easily understood. 
Likewise, an adequate basis for making policy decisions on the best and most 
effective adaptation strategy should be available to policymakers. These 
information are not currently available in the study areas.  
4. Adaptation strategies are not based on scientific evidence. 
Accurate information on vulnerable areas and the extent of vulnerability of the 
various sectors of society are needed in preparing appropriate adaptation 
strategies.  However, these were not available in the study LGUs. The LGUs 
did not have a rain gauge that would measure rainfall or a flood warning signal 
that would alert the public to take necessary actions.  According to the 
Contingency Planning for Emergencies Manual for LGUs (2003), the 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of information on vulnerability is the 
springboard to all emergency preparedness, mitigation, and readiness.  Simple 
measures and procedures that are doable by the locals are very important, and 
these do not have to involve a state-of-the-art computer system. 
5. LGUs do not generate local level data that would indicate threats to local 
residents. 
The information disseminated to the public and monitored by the LDCC is 
based on national PAGASA typhoon warning signals, which can be accessed 
from radio and television networks. Critical local level information on, say, 
potential flooding, is not available. 
6. All the local government officials involved in LDCC work are seconded staff 
who work full-time in other departments.  
The LDCC is activated when there are typhoon warnings, and the 
implementation of the DRM activities depend largely on the initiatives of the 
designated disaster coordinator. During normal times, the disaster coordinator 
works full-time on his regular assignment and nobody takes charge of 
regularly pursuing activities for disaster preparedness. 
7. There is no monitoring and evaluation (M&E) to assess the effectiveness of 
adaptation strategies.  
M&E is an essential component of a DRM system to ensure that effective 
response strategies are sustained and that necessary corrective measures are 
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instituted.  San Juan and Tanauan City still do not have M&E systems.  The 
DRM approaches are generally rescue and relief. Further, these approaches 
need revision and a long-term M&E plan must still be prepared. 
8. Community and resource mobilization systems are not institutionalized.  
One of the principles of disaster preparedness is that preparedness is a 
responsibility of all sectors, not of the government alone. The government 
provides the response framework to guide the stakeholders and to coordinate 
community action. Moreover, the government creates the enabling 
environment to motivate and mobilize concerned sectors (i.e., private business, 
NGOs, and LCOs). 
In the study community, LCOs volunteered in relief and rescue operations and 
expressed their willingness to help in similar future events. There was no 
formal link between the LDCC, LCOs, and the private sectors. The LGUs 
should recognize these potential partners and establish systematic protocols 
and networks based on a thorough assessment of resource needs and 
capability. Different groups have different capabilities for relief and rescue, 
program planning, and implementation that can be mobilized in various 
activities for climate change adaptation.  
9. LGUs, communities, and LCOs have misperceived level of adaptive capacity.   
The LGUs, communities, and LCOs did not have a clear idea about their 
deficiencies (e.g., technology such as rain gauge and flood level measuring 
device). The misperception may stem from their lack of comprehension and 
misconception about climate risk and appropriate climate risk management 
mechanisms.  
10. LGUs had poor compliance with DRM planning protocols. 
The Contingency Planning for Emergencies Manual for LGUs (2003), which 
should guide LGUs in disaster preparedness, outlines the essential elements of 
disaster preparedness. Among these elements were vulnerability map, 
monitoring and evaluation system, public awareness and community 
participation, and organizational and human resource development. Both 
LGUs have not complied with these requirements. If the LGUs would be 
judged based on their compliance with PD 1566 (1978) and the manual, then 
their level of disaster preparedness and adaptive capacity would be considered 
very low. 
11. Appropriate information materials were lacking. 
5.0  ADAPTIVE CAPACITY AND ADAPTATION STRATEGIES OF 
 HOUSEHOLDS 
5.1   Adaptive Capacity of Households   
The respondents interviewed in the household survey were mainly the head 
(53%) of households (Table 9) and their spouses (39%) or relatives. Majority of the 
respondents (67%) were female with an average age of 47 years.  The youngest 
respondent was 18 and the oldest was 93 years old. The households have been living 




Table 9. Demographic characteristics of sample household survey respondents  
Item 
Lowland Coastal Total 
N % N % N % 
Total no. of respondents 200 200 400 
 Category of respondent       
   Head of household 103 51.50 110 55.00 213 53.25 
   Spouse of HH head 86 43.00 72 36.00 158 39.50 
   Relative of HH head 11 5.50 18 9.00 29 7.25 
Gender       
    Male 56 28.00 74 37.00 130 32.50 
    Female 144 72.00 126 63.00 270 67.50 
Average Age (years) 48.05 46.50 47.28 
   Age distribution       
      18-35 44 22.00 44 22.00 88 22.00 
      36-60 115 57.50 123 61.50 238 59.50 
      61 and above 41 20.50 33 16.50 74 18.50 
Average number of years living in 
the area 25.11 23.88 24.50 
 
5.1.1  Household’s adaptive capacity index 
Based on the overall household adaptive capacity index (HACI), lowland and 
coastal households were of equal standing (i.e., 0.48).  However, they differed in 
specific indicators. For instance, lowland households had the highest capacity index in 
infrastructure (0.64), followed by technology, and lowest in social capital (0.35).  On 
the other hand, coastal households fared highest in social capital (0.68), followed by 
economic adaptive capacity, and lowest in skills and knowledge (Table 10).  
Table 10.  Household adaptive capacity index in lowland and coastal areas 
Indicator 
Lowland  Coastal  
HACI Rank HACI Rank 
Infrastructure 0.6407 1 0.3659 4 
Economic 0.3793 4 0.5450 2 
Technology 0.5238 2 0.4690 3 
Social capital 0.3542 5 0.6866 1 
Skills and knowledge 0.5111 3 0.3444 5 
Average 0.4818 - 0.4822 - 
 
5.1.2 Infrastructure indicators  
Over 90 percent of the households in both lowland and coastal areas owned 
their houses, which usually built with semi-permanent to permanent materials (e.g., 
concrete, wood) (Figure 11). However, only 25 percent had two-storey or one-storey 
houses with elevated ground floors. Over 90 percent had electricity connections, and 
they sourced their drinking water from pipe water and tube wells or hand pumps.    




Figure 11. Percentage distribution of households by degree of      
                      permanence of house 
 
5.1.3  Economic indicators 
Economic indicators of adaptive capacity of households included 
landholdings, other properties such as vehicles, and income.  
Landholdings 
Households‘ landholdings included residential lots and farmlands. An average 
residential lot was almost 400 sq m (Table 11).  Residential lots of lowland 
households were larger than those of coastal households.  Around 55% of the 
respondents in the lowlands owned the land where their houses were built with an 
average size of 347 sq m.  In the coastal area, around 46 percent owned their 
residential lot in coastal barangays with an average size of 412 sq m. Over 45 percent  
of the households in the coastal barangays occupied lots provided free by relatives or 
in-laws or they were informal settlers. 
Irrigated lands, planted mainly to rice, had an average size of 21,705 sq m and 
were larger in lowland barangays than in coastal barangays.  Less than 1 percent of 
households owned irrigated farm lands, while 2 percent were under tenancy 
arrangement.   
Around 12 percent of the households cultivated non-irrigated lands planted to 
vegetables and fruit crops. These non-irrigated farms had an average size of over 
14,000 sq m in the lowland barangays and over 6,000 sq m in coastal barangays.  
Only around 5 percent of the households owned the non-irrigated farms they were 
cultivating and another 5 percent had their farmlands lent for free by relatives and 
under tenancy arrangement.  
Other household assets included vehicles and boats.  Over 11 percent  of the  





Table 11. Landholdings of sample lowland and coastal households 
Item 
 
















Total no. of respondents  200 200 400 
Residential lot  457  336  396  
      Owned  347 55.50 412 46.00 376 50.75 
      Rented 90 1.00 45 2.00 60 1.50 
      Provided free 654 40.00 306 45.50 469 42.75 
      Mortgage 200 0.50 0 0 200 0.25 
      Tenant 133 1.00 114 5.00 117 3.00 
      Squatter 80 2.50 110 2.00 93 2.25 
Farm land (irrigated) 30,000  18,595  21,705  
      Owned  60,000 0.50 760 0.50 30,380 0.50 
      Lent by relative for free     0 0 10,000 0.50 10,000 0.25 
      Tenanted  15,000 1.00 23,000 3.00 21,000 2.00 
Farm land (non-irrigated) 14,135  6,555  10,587  
      Owned 2,720 5.00 2,916 6.50 2,831 5.75 
      Rented 70,000 0.50 10,000 0.50 40,000 0.50 
      Lent by relative for free 19,010 3.50 1,933 1.50 13,887 2.50 
      Mortgage 10,000 0.50 7,500 1.00 8,333 0.75 
      Tenanted 18,851 3.00 25,166 1.50 20,956 2.25 
   
Sources of income, food consumption, and credit needs 
The sample households had an average household size of 5.19 members. But 
around 83 percent of the households had an average of only one family member who 
was working. The dependency ratio was high as over 60 percent of the households 
had members below 15 years of age and over 28 percent had members above 60 years 
old.   
The major sources of income of the households were self-employment (e.g., 
small retail store, food vending) (36%) and waged labor (e.g., factory worker) (above 
30% of households). Around 14 percent of households were engaged in agriculture 
and over 8 percent in fishing.   
Average household income per year was PhP118,102 or US$2,567 with 
households in the lowland barangays having higher income than households along 
coastal zones.  The income poverty threshold level for Batangas province was 
PhP16,836 (US$366) per capita per year (nscb.gov.ph). With an average family size 
of five, the household income poverty threshold was PhP84,180 (US$1,830). 
Although the average income of total sample households was higher than the poverty 
threshold level, the percentage distribution of households by income revealed that 
over 52 percent  were below the threshold level. Based on ecozone, there were more 
sample households (55%) in the coastal areas that were considered poor than in the 





Figure 12. Average household income per year by source, by ecozone 
 With a few sample farming households, it is understandable that majority 
(80%) of the households were not producing the food they consumed. Around 16% of 
the respondents produced less than 50 percent of their food.   
Over 80 percent of the respondents claimed that they could borrow money 
when needed.  The most common credit source for both lowland (60.5%) and coastal 
(69.5%) households were their relatives or friends. About 18 percent of the lowland 
and 19 percent of the coastal households also sourced their credit from a formal 
financial institution.  
5.1.4  Technology indicators  
Technology indicators of adaptive capacity of households included first, 
availability and accessibility of shelter where they could evacuate in case of severe 
disasters, and second, means of communication by which the households could 
receive information or news. 
Accessibility to shelter 
In the study barangays, the government established shelters or evacuation 
centers in the public elementary school and in the barangay hall. The sample 
households in lowland barangays were closer (0.63 km) to the barangay hall than the 
coastal households (1.07 km) (Table 12). Aside from such government facilities, other 
types of shelter included relatives‘ and neighbors‘ houses. In the coastal areas, more 
of the respondents (31%) evacuated to neighbors‘ and relatives‘ houses than in 
government shelters (11.25%). In the lowland areas, however, the government centers 
were the preferred shelter by many respondents (30%) because the evacuees only had 
to walk to these shelters from their houses. About 80 percent of the respondents in 
both ecozones had easy access to the evacuation centers (Figure 13). However, only 
an average of 37 percent of the respondents evacuated. Majority of them, 65 percent 
in the lowland and 60 percent in the coastal areas, decided not to evacuate because 




Table 12. Access of lowland and coastal households to shelter during severe disasters 
Item Proportion/Ecozone Lowland Coastal 
Total no. of respondents 200 200 
Average distance (km) of house from barangay hall 0.63 1.07 
 Evacuated  35.00 40.00 
     Type of shelter   
         Government building 30.00 11.25 
         Neighbors‘/relatives‘ house 21.50 31.00 
         Others (religious buildings, rice mill, old piggery) 3.00 4.50 
     Means of transportation   
        Walking 94.29 95.00 
        Transport vehicle (e.g. , tricycle, jeep, truck) 5.71 5.00 
Did not evacuate 65.00 60.00 
     Reason for not evacuating   
       Own house is safe 93.08 87.50 




     Figure 13.  Percentage of households reporting on accessibility of  
   evacuation center/safer place, by ecozone 
Sources of information  
  As for medium through which the respondents received information or news, 
television (90%) was the most popular, followed by radio (35%). Only a few 
respondents (10%) cited local government officials as their source of information.  
5.1.5   Social capital indicators 
Social relations of households and interaction of residents in the neighborhood 
or within the community was an indication of the households‘ adaptive capacity.     
Membership in community organization 
 Majority (69%) of the respondents have not joined any community 
organization. The rest were members of women‘s or men‘s organization; veterans‘, 
farmers‘, or fisherfolk association; cooperative/microfinance; and health-related, 
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religious, and civic organizations. Around 87 percent of the households who were 
members of organizations actively participated in the organizations‘ activities.  
Sources of help  
 Majority (72%) of respondents turned to other individuals or institutions for 
help in financial or other problems. Relatives/neighbors were the most commonly 
approached people for financial assistance (79.66%). A few ran to LGUs for financial 
support (15). shelter (4), building materials (2), and medical items (1), while many ran 
to relatives or neighbors for food and clothing (38).  
Interaction in the community 
Around 39 percent of the respondents had no knowledge of how often the 
villages met to discuss common issues concerning their community.  Around 20 
percent claimed that they met once or twice a year. 
On issues related to climate change or related disasters, 34 percent claimed 
that the community members did not interact, while 26 percent of the respondents 
reported that there were some interactions.  
5.1.6  Skills and knowledge indicators 
The respondents in both barangays had generally low level of education. 
About 45 percent of the lowland and 47 percent of the coastal respondents were able 
to finish 7 to 10 years of schooling while 37 percent (lowland) and 35 percent 
(coastal) were able to complete not more than 6 years. Less than 20 percent of the 
respondents reached college level (Figure 14).  
 
Figure 14. Educational attainment of household respondents 
Training 
Only 8 percent of the respondents have attended training on disaster 
preparedness, but majority (65%) thought that such training should be provided. They 
heard about the training from municipal and barangay officials, colleagues at work, 
relatives and friends, and other local organizations. The three most important points 
they learned from the training related to being alert, storing food and other needs, and 
assisting in evacuation.  
Indigenous knowledge 
 Over 17 percent of the household respondents had existing indigenous 
knowledge and practices in their area related to the incidence of natural disasters. 
Their observations in the environment, such as the behavior of animals, birds, insects, 




5.2   Typhoon Milenyo and its impacts on households  
Around 68 percent of the households claimed that typhoon/flooding occurred 
every year and a little over 50 percent recalled that Typhoon Milenyo in 2006 caused 
flooding (Table 13). Within the yard of lowland households, flood water was 1.145 m 
high, while in coastal households, flood reached around 0.7 m high.  With many 
households having a one-storey house, flood water went inside their houses. The flood 
level was higher in lowland households than in coastal households. Typhoon Milenyo 
brought strong winds but not that much rainfall to cause overflows from rivers and 
severe flooding in the coastal area.  Flooding in the lowland areas was associated with 
water coming from uplands aggravated by clogged waterways.  




N % N % 
Total no. of respondents 200 200 
Frequency of typhoon/ flooding     
     Yearly 141 71.00 132 66.00 
     Every five years 10 5.00 16 8.00 
     Every ten years 4 2.00 1 0.50 
     Rarely 45 23.00 51 26.00 
Typhoon Milenyo caused flooding 124 62.00 79 40.00 
Average height of flood      
      Within the yard (m) 1.145  0.737  
           Number reporting  124 62.00 79 40.00 
      Inside the house (m) 1.046  0.695  
           Number reporting  91 46.00 59 30.00 
 
Among the lowland households, 47 percent experienced little damage while 31 
percent had severe damage. In the coastal areas, fewer households (26%) had severe 
damage. 
5.2.1  Damages/losses experienced by households  
Typhoon Milenyo destroyed household properties that included the house, 
appliances, vehicles, and other amenities such as electricity, water supply, and 
communication lines. It likewise damaged household production such as in 
agriculture, fishing, and business; and foregone income from waged labor of 
household members. Moreover, the safety of household members was jeopardized 
because of injury and illnesses caused by the typhoon.  
The average amount of losses caused by typhoon Milenyo was over 
PhP11,000 (US$230), which was approximately 10% of the average annual household 
income. On average, the coastal households suffered higher amount of losses from 
Typhoon Milenyo.   
More than half of the respondents reported damages to their houses as their 
house structures were either semi-permanent or not permanent. For coastal 
households, damage to their house incurred the highest cost (PhP15,000 or  US$328) 
among the various damages.  For lowland households, the damage in agriculture, 
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practically wiping out their expected earnings, incurred the highest cost for the 
respondents (Figure 15).  
Agricultural households in the coastal areas also lost about 27 percent of their 
income. Meanwhile, losses in income from businesses and employment were 
relatively lower accounting for 3 percent (coastal households) to 7 percent (lowland) 
of their income. Foregone income from wage labor accounted for around 2 percent in 
both lowland and coastal households.  
As for danger brought to household members, one lowland household reported 
that one member got injured, costing the household PhP50,000 (around US$1000) for 
hospitalization. A few households (over 1%) also had to spend on medicine for 
illnesses such as asthma and fever caused by exposure to the typhoon. 
Figure 15. Cost of damage brought by Typhoon Milenyo, 2006 
 
5.2.2  Benefits derived from Typhoon Milenyo 
There were also some benefits derived from Typhoon Milenyo as reported by 
a few (7%) household respondents. More coastal households (11%) than lowland 
households had gains such as higher fish catch as fish were released from damaged 
fish pens. Retail stores also increased their sales for supplying the immediate needs of 
the residents.  Lowland households gained from collecting fruits that fell from trees. 
5.2.3  Recovery period 
Households that relied on agriculture, livestock, and aquaculture as source of 
income took a longer (around one year) time to recover from losses/damages caused 
by Typhoon Milenyo (Figure 16). They have not yet repaid their loans, which they 
invested in their production. Other households with income from non-farm and 




Figure 16. Households‘ recovery period from losses per income source  
      because of Typhoon Milenyo 
Between 2006 (when Typhoon Milenyo occurred) and 2008, all households 
had an increase in income from all sources except fishing that remained the same. 
Livestock registered a 37 percent increase on average, while agriculture posted 28% 
increase in income (Figure 17). 
 
Figure 17.  Percent change in household income from 2006 (year of      
          Typhoon Milenyo) 
 
5.3  Adaptation Behavior of Households  
5.3.1  Warning received by households 
Almost all respondents (98%) received a warning before Typhoon Milenyo hit 
their areas. The information came mostly (90%) from broadcast media such as 
television and radio (Table 14). A higher percentage (24%) of lowland households 
than coastal households (3%) got warning from the LGU. Neighbors were also a 
source of warning information of the respondents (7%). Around 98% of the 
respondents understood the message that they received 13 hours (on average) before 
the typhoon hit their area. This is actually the lead time for storm warning signal no. 4 
(above 185 kph wind speed) in the Philippines. Majority of the respondents were able 




Table 14.  Warning or advice received by lowland and coastal households  




N % N % 
Total no. of respondents 200 200 
Received warning 196 98.00 197 98.50 
Source  of warning information     
       Local government unit 48 24.00 12 6.00 
       Media (television, radio) 178 89.00 184 92.00 
       Neighbor/Relative 19 9.50 20 10.00 
Understood  the message 195 97.50 198 99.00 
 Average number of hours warning received  before 
typhoon Milenyo hit the area 13.19 14.34 
        No.  reporting 194 97.00 196 98.00 
Average number of hours it took the household to act /cope 
with Typhoon Milenyo 3.28 2.16 
        Number reporting 194 97.00 196 98.00 
 
5.3.2   Adaptation strategies to deal with Typhoon Milenyo 
Adaptation strategies adopted by households could be classified as behavioral, 
structural, and financial (Table 15).  
Households practiced various behavioral adaptation measures. Majority (62%) 
put priority in ensuring basic necessities of the households such as food, water, and 
other household needs before the occurrence of Typhoon Milenyo. Around 7 percent 
looked after the safety of their family by moving to a safer place before the typhoon 
or by just staying at home during the typhoon. Moreover, around 40 percent protected 
their household properties by securing their boats; putting their livestock and 
household items in safer place; and wrapping their clothes in plastic bags and placing 
these inside a small drum as protection from wetness.   
In terms of structural measures, more than 50 percent of the households 
secured their houses by securing these with ropes and putting concrete slabs on the 
roof for protection against the wind before the typhoon. After the typhoon, one of the 
first things they did was to repair or reinforce their houses. This is understandable 
because majority of the respondents owned their houses.  
Only a few households practiced technological strategies such as planting trees 




Table 15.  Adaptation strategies adopted by lowland and coastal households to    




N % N % 
Behavioral         
Moved family members to safe place 60 30.00 56 28.00 
Stayed in shelters and waited for the disaster to stop 136 68.00 154 77.00 
Secured belongings (ships, boats, livestock, household items) 94 47.00 77 38.50 
Monitored typhoon warning signal 44 22.00 43 21.50 
Stored food and water 121 60.50 130 65.00 
Helped neighbors 12 6.00 5 2.50 
Sought government assistance 20 10.00 10 5.00 
Sought support from relatives 10 5.00 7 3.50 
Structural         
Reinforced house 97 48.50 136 68.00 
Repaired house and furniture 102 51.00 120 60.00 
Repaired dykes/ponds 16 8.00 3 1.50 
Technological          
Cut the trees around the house to prevent damage from falling 
branches 14 7.00 20 10.00 
Financial         
Coped with financial shortage (withdrawing from savings, selling 
stocks, borrowing money ) 1 0.50 5 2.50 
Sold assets: gold, motorbike, land, livestock; sold means of 
production: seeds, cattles, machines 4 2.00 0 0.00 
The most popular reason of the respondents for their adaptation practice was 
that it was the most common strategy and everyone was doing it. Other reasons 
included the low cost of the adaptation practice and the recommendation of neighbors 
or experts for the strategy.  
Among the strategies adopted, what were the most effective? A total of 36 
percent of the households cited storing of food, water, and basic household needs and 
staying at home during the typhoon. Around 11 percent listed securing the boat, 
livestock, and household items in safer places and regularly updating of warning 
information as effective.   
Structural measure such as reinforcing the house before the typhoon was rated 
not effective by 10 to 14 percent of households. This is understandable as damage to 
houses was the worst experienced by the households.  
5.3.3  Collective adaptation 
 Majority of the respondents in both lowland (68%) and coastal (59%) 
households claimed that there was no collective action in their area to respond to 
Typhoon Milenyo because of the lack of cooperation or unity among the community 
members. Around 10 percent said that they did not know how to act collectively in 
dealing with the typhoon.   
Around 40 percent of the household respondents reported that somebody (the 
respondent, spouse, sibling, or in-law) in the family participated in collective actions 
to deal with Typhoon Milenyo. For example, the family member spent around 0.5 
man-days in helping to disseminate early warning information (before the typhoon) 
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(Table 16).  During the typhoon, family members spent almost one man-day in 
assisting in the evacuation and rescue operations and in performing other activities 
such as providing shelter.  Among coastal household respondents, more time, e.g., 5 
man-days were spent for activities after the typhoon, such as in mobilizing assistance 
in distributing goods; and 2 man-days in repairing electrical facilities. Only one 
coastal household donated cash (PhP200 or US$4) after the typhoon.   
Table 16. Average time (man-days) spent by family members who participated in   
                 collective action to deal with Typhoon Milenyo 










Total no. of respondents 200 200 
No. of respondents with household members who participated 84 42.00 81 40.50 
Before Milenyo     
Warned community members 0.45 19.05 0.57 12.34 
Helped people to reinforce and harvest crop 0.20  0.08                                             
     Number reporting 4 4.76 5 6.17 
Other activities (coordinated at barangay  level to provide 
evacuation equipment, moved livestock to safer places) 0.27 8.33 1.13 7.88 
During Milenyo     
Assisted in evacuation, relief, and rescue operation 0.64 26.19 0.90 20.99 
Monitored the situation 0.72 10.71 0.90 7.41 
After Milenyo      
Helped assess social condition 0.47 10.71 1.92 3.70 
Helped repair damaged dwellings 0.71 30.95 0.67 33.33 
Extended credit to other community members 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.23 
Helped in relief goods distribution 0.84 19.04 3.25 12.34 
Other activities (repaired damaged electrical facilities in the 
barangay, helped put back household items, provided shelter, 
helped neighbors organize and clean up) 
0.75 7.14 1.25 6.07 
 
5.3.4  Assistance from external sources 
Majority of the respondents (58%) did not receive assistance from external 
sources particularly after the typhoon (Table 17).  From those who received 
assistance, 82 percent received relief goods and 19 percent received financial 
assistance from the LGUs. Relatives or friends also provided financial support to 22 
percent and relief goods and shelter to 10 percent of the respondents.  
Table 17.  Percentage distribution of households who received assistance  
 from external sources 
Item Lowland Coastal Total N % N % N % 
Total no. of respondents 200 200 400 
Did your HH receive assistance       
           No 126 63 108 54 234 58.5 
           Yes 74 37 92 46 166 41.5 
Timing of Assistance       
           Before  0 0 2 1 2 0.5 
           During 4 2 2 1 6 1.5 




5.4     Other Adaptation Possibilities for Households and Constraints to Adoption 
5.4.1  Adaptation options identified by households 
The households were aware of the behavioral, structural, and technological 
adaptation options, but they were not able to do these with Typhoon Milenyo because 
of some constraints. Around 26 percent said that they should have reinforced the 
house before the typhoon (Tables 18). During the typhoon, a few households said that 
they should have moved the family members and household items to a safer place. 
Some said that they should have repaired household damages after the typhoon.  
 
Table 18. Other adaptation options identified by respondents but were not undertaken 
by lowland and coastal households 
Adaptation options Lowland Coastal 
N % N % 
Behavioral         
Buy and store food, drinking water, and other necessities 19 9.50 13 6.50 
Move household items to a safe place 9 5.50 11 5.50 
Gather harvestable crops/harvest earlier 4 1.50 2 0.50 
Evacuate to a safer place 6 3.00 8 4.00 
Structural         
Reinforce/improve house 57 28.50 50 25.00 
Technological         
Cut/trim trees near the house 6 3.00 6 3.00 
The households were not able to do these activities because of financial 
constraints. Others did not act early because they did not expect the coming typhoon 
to be that strong. The respondents realized that they should always be prepared, save 
for emergency situation, and monitor the typhoon forecast. 
5.4.2  Adaptation options identified by experts  
Majority of the respondents agreed to attend trainings on climate change 
adaptation (75%) and to participate in community-organized activities (67%). 
However, 59% were not willing to move to a safer place permanently (Table 19).  
 
Table 19. Other adaptation options identified by experts and willingness of  
                households to adopt 
Adaptation Option/Willingness to Adopt Lowland Coastal N % N % 
Total no. of respondents 200 200 
Move voluntarily to an evacuation center 83 41.50 88 44.00 
Wait first for advise to evacuate 26 13.00 27 13.50 
Avail of housing and crop insurance 60 30.00 75 37.50 
Permanently move to a safer place 29 14.50 19 9.50 
Attend trainings on CCA and DRM 149 74.50 152 76.00 
Participate in community-organized activities 122 61.00 147 73.50 
Those who were willing to evacuate reasoned out that the safety of their 
family would be assured. Availing of insurance would be of financial help and 
attending trainings would help them gain knowledge in disaster preparedness. 
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Participating in community-organized activities would also be spiritually uplifting 
for them.    
Those who were not willing to evacuate thought that it was safer to stay at 
home and that it was difficult to stay in evacuation centers. Many were not willing to 
move permanently to a safer place, and this was understandable because majority of 
them owned their houses and the lots, and they had no other place to go.  They also 
thought that it was expensive to move and that typhoons would come anywhere they 
go anyway.  Respondents who were not willing to attend trainings or participate in 
community-organized activities thought that they were already old for such 
activities. They also said that they could obtain information about the typhoon from 
television and radio. Households who were not willing to take up insurance reasoned 
out that they lacked funds, their property was not worth insuring, and it was hard to 
trust an insurance company.  
Respondents who were not sure if they would evacuate said that their decision 
depended on how strong the typhoon was going to be, thus they had to first assess 
the situation. Their concern in taking up insurance was the insurance company‘s 
credibility. Their participation in training and community-based activities depended 
on the duration of these activities as they had other work to do.  
Household needs to deal with typhoon events 
The two most important needs cited by the households to deal with typhoon 
events such as Milenyo were financial assistance and the building of strong 
infrastructure. Forty-five percent (45%) said they were no longer hoping and leaving 
things to fate.  
5.5  Perception Toward Future Risks and Lessons Learned 
Majority of the respondents (95%) ―agree‖ to ―strongly agree‖ that their 
experience with an extreme typhoon event such as Milenyo was a matter of fate over 
which they had little control (Figure 18).  Among these respondents, 34 percent had 
elementary education, 4 percent reached high school, and 16 percent had college 
education.   
 
Figure 18. Proportion of households that believed that the incidence of a  




Moreover, 56 percent of respondents were not sure if future typhoon events   
would be more severe or just about the same as what they have experienced with 
Milenyo.  Those who thought that future events would be more severe (18%) 
reasoned out that natural resources were overexploited, and climate change would 
induce more rainfall.   
Even while being unsure of the severity of future typhoons, majority of the 
households (53%) expressed no plan to prevent their possible impacts. Those with a 
plan were thinking of moving to other places or were working hard to prepare for a 
typhoon. 
 The major lesson the households learned from their experience with Typhoon 
Milenyo was to be alert/prepared. Others realized that it was necessary to improve or 
secure the house and to prepare a household‘s basic necessities.     
While the household respondents believed that there were existing programs 
addressing adaptation to typhoons in their locality such as the disaster protocol, they 
also pointed to the other role of LGUs in minimizing risks and in facilitating 
rehabilitation recovery. These pertain to an early warning system, information 
campaign, and monitoring system. Many believed that PAGASA forecasts were 
reliable, but others pointed to the need for localized forecasting. Community 
organizations, for instance, could help in providing financial assistance and other 
services such as in a warning system, in information dissemination, and in rescue and 
relief operations.  
6.0 THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS IN ADAPTATION TO 
        TYPHOON MILENYO 
Three local community organizations (LCOs) in San Juan and eight in 
Tanauan were covered by the study. The community organizations interviewed 
included barangay- based and/or municipality or city-based fisherfolks organizations, 
farmers‘ associations, civic organizations, and women, men and youth groups. The 
local community organizations‘ response actions differed considerably, primarily 
because disaster risk management was not part of their mission.  
6.1 Adaptive Capacity of Local Community Organizations 
Human Resource Indicators 
These organizations had limited human resource capability. The number of 
officers ranged from eight to 33, and they did not have any regular staff. Their size 
also varied. The smallest in membership was Ticalan Farmers Association (TFA) with 
20 members, while the biggest was Knights of Columbus ( KC) with 200 members. 
Their total membership constituted only less than 1 percent of the total community 
population. Also, none of these LCOs was organized in connection with DRM or 
CRM.  
In Tanauan City, the eight LCOs were rural-based and represented the 
different sectors of the community, i.e., elderly, farmers, fisherfolks, religious, and 
interestingly, gender groupings. The biggest local organization was Ambulong Senior 
Citizens Organization with 215 members, while the smallest was Barangay 
Lithurgical Council with 10 members. The number of officers ranged from seven to 
11, while total membership constituted about 0.83 to 18.94 percent of the total 
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population in the areas where they operated. None of these organizations were formed 
in connection with DRM. One farmer association in San Juan had members who have 
attended disaster management training.  
Economic/Financial Resources 
The community organizations varied significantly in their level of economic or 
financial resource capability, although most of them had limited resources, and they 
sourced their funds from their own members‘ annual dues and membership fees.  
In San Juan, the biggest community organization in terms of financial 
resources was the Rotary Club.  Its members paid PhP4,800 (US$100) annually, and it 
had a total annual collection of about PhP129,600 (US$2,700). The smallest was 
Knights of Columbus with its members paying only about PhP480 (US$10) per year. 
In Tanauan City, the biggest community organization was Ambulong Senior 
Citizens Organization, while the smallest was the Kalipunan ng Liping Pilipina 
(KALIPI) or Filipino Women‘s League. These community organizations collected 
membership and annual dues of PhP62,350 (US$1,298) and PhP3,640 (US$75), 
respectively. These organizations‘ main source of funds was membership dues, which 
ranged from PhP10 per member (US$0.21) for KALIPI to PhP200 per member 
(US$4) for Altura Farmers Association per month.  
Among all the community organizations interviewed, only KC and RC set 
aside financial resources for disaster relief assistance in the amount of PhP20,000 
(US$416) and PhP30,000 (US$625), respectively. 
Institutions and Networks 
KC and RC conducted meetings regularly in accordance with their charters. 
KC conducted an average of two meetings per month while RC conducted an average 
of four meetings per month. TFA, which was newly reorganized, had held only one 
meeting and this was attended by all its members. Only KALIPI in Tanauan City 
conducted regular meetings, but members of the other LCOs were generally easy to 
mobilize, particularly during emergency situations.  
Community organization members contributed cash and/or material support to 
other community members in case of emergencies. The values of sharing and 
―bayanihan‖ were quite strong in these communities. 
Many members of the local community organizations were also members of 
other groups/organizations.  For instance, the key informant from TFA was a former 
member of the local legislative body.  The local KC and RC were affiliated with the 
provincial and national chapters of their organizations. 
In Tanauan City, the local KALIPI and Senior Citizens organization Chapters 
were affiliated with municipal-level organizations.  However, some organizations 
such as the Empowerment and Reaffirmation Paternal Abilities Training (ERPAT), 
Gran Boys, and Altura Farmers‘ and Fisherfolks‘ Association existed only in the 
study areas.  
All these LCOs were organized mainly for social and civic purposes, but 
members helped LGUs in relief and rescue operations during times of calamity. For 
instance, ERPAT members helped to bring Typhoon Milenyo victims to the hospitals 
and KALIPI helped barangay officials in warning people at risk from Typhoon 
Milenyo, while KC and RC helped in relief operations. 
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Knowledge and Skills 
The level of education of the community organization leaders varied 
considerably depending on the type of organization.  Leaders of KC and RC had an 
average of 14 years of education, while the TFA leader had only six years of 
education. 
In Tanauan City, organization leaders of KALIPI, Barangay Lithurgical 
Council, and Ambulong Senior Citizen had an average of 14 years of education, while 
the rest of the LCO leaders had six years of education.  None of these LCOs 
conducted a training on disaster risk management for their members. Many of the KC 
and RC members learned about disaster risk management from their schools and 
business associations, while only KALIPI members have attended a training on 
disaster management. 
Technology and Infrastructure 
In San Juan, information about Typhoon Milenyo was sourced from radio and 
television alone. RC and KC disseminated the information about climate change 
events through text messaging, while TFA did not participate, as an organization, in 
any Typhoon Milenyo-related activity. The COs did not own any means of 
transportation/ equipment.  
Most of the LCOs interviewed, except for KC in San Juan, did not have an 
evacuation center in case a climate change-induced event or disaster occurred. KC had 
a clubhouse near the church that could be used as evacuation center. The evacuation 
centers used by the LGUs were public school buildings, barangay halls, or churches. 
6.2 Adaptation Strategies Undertaken by Community Organizations  
Community organizations in the study areas do not have mandates explicitly 
related to climate-related disaster management. However, with the general mission of 
providing service to the community, some COs got involved particularly in relief 
operations in times of calamity.   
In Tanauan City, members of KALIPI participated in early warning campaign 
of barangay officials before Typhoon Milenyo occurred. Ambulong Fisherfolks‘ 
Association helped in evacuating people to safer places and in reinforcing neighbors‘ 
houses. It also monitored the situation of the families living along the lake‘s shore. 
Some members of ERPAT helped in emergency cases like bringing injured person to 
the hospital (Table 20). In San Juan, some KC and RC members communicated with 
other members about the status of the Typhoon Milenyo in their locality. 
It was after the typhoon that other COs like the KC, Rotary Club, and ERPAT 
helped in relief operations. KC and RC distributed relief goods to affected people.  
KC and RC funded their relief operation out of their own internal budget. They 
distributed relief goods to the affected families of San Juan. KC also contributed 
about PhP15,000 (US$312) to Typhoon Milenyo victims in Albay Province. As socio-
civic organizations, these COs would carry out similar activities in future typhoon 
events like Milenyo and if the situation calls for their assistance.  
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 Table 20.  Adaptation strategies done by community organizations for Typhoon   
                   Milenyo, September 2006 
Type of 
Adaptation San Juan Tanauan City  
Prior to Milenyo 
Behavioral Fisherfolks’ Association: 
-  brought people to safer place 
-  helped in reinforcing houses 
 
KALIPI: 
- participated in early warning campaign of  
   barangay officials 
Ambulong Fisherfolks Association:  
- brought the people to a safer place 
- helped in reinforcing houses 
Farmers’ Association: 
- helped in warning the residents of the  
  coming typhoon 
During Milenyo 
Behavioral Fisherfolks’ Association: 
- monitored bancas and families  
    living in the lakeshore 
KALIPI: 
-monitored the situation in the barangay 
Ambulong Fisherfolks Association: 
-monitored fishing boats and families living in   
 the lakeshore 
ERPAT:  
- helped in emergency cases 
- brought injured to the hospital 
Post Milenyo 
Behavioral - distributed relief goods (worth 
PhP20,000 (US$416) from KC 
and PhP30,000 (US$625)from 
RC)  
- RC conducted medical mission 
 
All LCOs helped in clearing activities. 
ERPAT:  
- helped in emergency cases 
- brought injured to the hospital 
- helped in cleaning activities 
Gran Boys  
- monitored houses/ families 
Financial  
 
- Senior Citizens Association donated funds for  
   relief operation 
 
 The COs also experienced some losses from Typhoon Milenyo. The 
Ambulong Fisherfolk Association, in particular, reported that its members incurred 
damage and losses because of Typhoon Milenyo.  A total of 10 fishing boats were 
damaged and four were reported missing. However, such an event also created 
opportunities that others were able to benefit from.  For instance, the destroyed fish 
cages in Taal Lake, causing huge losses to fish cage owners, gave opportunity for 
small fisherfolks to catch the fish released from the fish cages.  One fish cage was also 
blown by windstorm to the shores of Barangay Ambulong. This gave the fisherfolks 
as well as other local residents additional income for about two weeks after Typhoon 
Milenyo.   
6.3 Other Adaptation Options Identified by Community Organizations   
According to the COs, the most vulnerable groups in their community were 
the children and the people living near the river. The COs suggested that the people 
should be more responsive and more alert to typhoon events. 
The COs also considered the lack of information about climate change as a 
factor that caused failure. KC and RC key informants believed that the information 
dissemination of LGUs was not enough and that it was constrained by lack of funds. 
Hence, the COs said that information campaign must be enhanced, and the campaign 
must be financed. They likewise recommended the conduct of massive IEC, 
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particularly on disaster preparedness and training/lecture on the preventive health 
measures. 
7.0 LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTIONS 
Judging by the key informants‘ responses about their adaptive capacity, 
adaptation behavior, and strategies, LGUs need some conceptual and operational 
reorientation in order to enhance their capability to address future typhoon events. The 
challenge is for the LGUs to review their capability, knowledge level, and systems 
and procedures in responding to typhoon and flooding in the context of climate 
change and climate risk management.  
Other challenges include: mobilizing COs as partners in climate risk 
management; educating and empowering the community to make CRM decisions 
independent of government initiatives; and mainstreaming CRM in the local 
development plan to facilitate resource mobilization. Mainstreaming CRM in the local 
plan is preferable to treating it as a calamity-based response with the LGU‘s calamity 
fund as the main budget source.  
7.1  Lessons Learned   
Significant lessons can be drawn from the experiences of San Juan and 
Tanauan City with Typhoon Milenyo and other typhoons that have caused severe 
damages in the recent years. These lessons have operational and policy implications 
as well as national and local applications. These can be used by the LGUs to improve 
their adaptive capacity and adaptation strategies. To synthesize the lessons, the LGUs‘ 
experiences were compared with good practices cited in the literature. 
Among the lessons learned are the following: 
1. LGUs and communities have to enhance their adaptive capacity and reorient 
their current adaptation strategies. The usual relief, rescue, and evacuation 
operations are no longer effective and could hardly be sustained considering 
the increasing intensity of Philippine typhoons and consequent flooding that 
may occur in the future. LGUs should institute effective and sustainable 
adaptation strategies, with the goal to prevent the recurrence of disaster and to 
develop higher level of resilience.   
2. Preparedness does not only mean stocking of relief goods and preparing rescue 
equipment.  It includes the ability to prevent risks from turning into disasters.  
It also includes an early warning system that can inform the people and 
decision makers to make timely and accurate decisions based on a commonly 
understood set of indicators. 
3. It is important for LGUs to have a localized flood warning system and not rely 
fully on national level forecasts, which only contain information on typhoons, 
wind direction, and wind velocity. 
4. The LGU officials and the people have yet to fully understand the implications 
of climate change and the changing typhoon intensity. They have to 
comprehend that the associated risks are not only incidental, but these have a 
certain degree of certainty, and that such extreme events could possibly recur 
more certainly in the future than before. The people‘s awareness of these 
climate change-related risks and the level of response needed to mitigate their 
adverse impacts could motivate people to improve their adaptation behavior.  
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Adaptive capacity of households to extreme climate events such as a typhoon 
indicates the households‘ ability to adjust its characteristics or behaviors to expand its 
coping range under such event. The indicators used to assess adaptive capacity of 
households were categorized into: a) infrastructure, b) economic, c) technology, d) 
social capital indicators, and e) skill and knowledge.   
Typhoon Milenyo (with international name Xangsane) was the extreme 
climate event addressed in this study.  This typhoon brought more strong winds than 
rainfall, causing rivers to overflow.  Flooding in the lowland areas was associated 
with water coming from uplands aggravated by clogged waterways.  Over 50% of the 
sample households reported a little damage, while 30% experienced severe damage. 
Based on the overall adaptive capacity index, lowland and coastal households 
were of equal standing at the rate of 0.48.  However, in specific indicators, lowland 
households fared better in infrastructure and technology, while coastal households 
fared better in social capital and economic adaptive capacity.  On the other hand, 
lowland households were weak in social capital, and coastal households in skills and 
knowledge.  
Households depending on non-farm and self-employment sources and waged 
labor had higher income than those depending on resource-based livelihood such as 
agriculture and fishing. Lowland households suffered the most losses in agricultural 
production, practically wiping out their expected earnings. Thus, it took them longer 
(more than half year) to recover from losses/damages. Losses in income from 
businesses and employment were relatively lower, accounting for 2 to 7 percent of 
their annual income. Hence, recovery was from one to two months after the typhoon. 
Some benefits derived from Typhoon Milenyo were higher fish catch from damaged 
fish pens and increased sales of retail stores.  
Most households obtained information on climate events from television and 
radio and observed the rare interaction on climate-related issues in the community.  
With their experience with Typhoon Milenyo, majority of the respondents agreed to 
strongly agreed that the typhoon was a matter of fate over which they had little 
control.  Being unsure of the severity of future typhoons, majority of the households 
(53%) expressed no plan to prevent their possible impacts. 
Majority had not joined any community organization or attended any training 
on disaster preparedness. During Typhoon Milenyo, collective actions were limited to 
disseminating early warning information, assisting in evacuation and rescue 
operations, and distributing relief goods from LGUs.  
Households practiced behavioral adaptation measures they knew or others 
were doing. These included ensuring basic necessities of the households such as food, 
water, and other household needs and looking after the safety of the family and 
household assets.  Households were not able to do other possible options because of 
financial constraints. Further, they did not expect the typhoon to be that strong and 
destructive.  
Although majority of the households had easy access to shelter and similar 
facilities, they would rather stay at home believing that they were safer in their own 
houses than in an evacuation center. More so, many were not willing to permanently 
move to a safer place because of their attachment to their properties, e.g., house and 
lot which they owned.   
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These findings conform to the ―green gap‖ analysis of Liverani (2009). 
Households‘ awareness of a climate change-related event has not been translated to 
individual actions. This non-translation was not only because of the low adaptive 
capacity of households but also because of their attitude and perception over climate 
change-related problems and solutions. This ―green gap‖ in public attitudes partly 
stems from how climate science has been communicated and how people‘s minds‘ 
have (mis)understood climate dynamics. Knowledge about climate change is not 
always expected to lead to action for several reasons: 1) people prioritize between a 
set of needs, and 2) people assess both the market and non-market implications of 
their decisions.   
While the household respondents believed that there were existing programs 
addressing adaptation to typhoons in their locality such as the disaster protocol, they 
also pointed to the other role of LGUs in minimizing risks and in facilitating 
rehabilitation recovery. These pertain to an early warning system, information 
campaign, and monitoring system. 
7.2   Recommended Courses of Actions that LGUs Should Undertake 
In the immediate future, the LGUs should improve their adaptive capacity, 
particularly in institutional framework and governance. They should then translate this 
capacity in formulating plans and strategies that would increase the resilience of 
communities to climate-change related events such as intense typhoons. The 
following measures are recommended:  
1. Review the DRM framework and formulate appropriate CRM strategies that 
are generally proactive to typhoon and flooding;  
2. Strengthen IEC programs by enriching the substantive content of lecture 
materials and by formulating a system of communicating and disseminating 
relevant information to decision makers and the general public. Aside from a 
clear and scientific discussion of the climate change phenomenon and its 
impact, the lecture should emphasize mitigation and adaptation strategies that 
the people can undertake to mitigate climate change and minimize its adverse 
impacts; 
3. Conduct science-based vulnerability analysis and prepare a vulnerability  map 
to identify vulnerable sectors and areas; 
4. Formulate a localized and community-based early warning system that 
specifies climate parameters that should be monitored and understood for 
critical decision points; 
5. Communicate early warning information to people to develop their skills in 
monitoring and interpreting critical climate parameters for appropriate and 
timely adaptation decisions; 
6. Communicate early warning signs to policy and decision makers  so they can 
formulate appropriate policies and make timely decisions;  
7. Maintain a knowledge management system wherein climate-related data will 
be systematically stored and retrieved for planning and policymaking 
purposes; and  
8. Consider CRM as a development activity that integrates preparedness; 
adaptive capacity enhancement and adaptation strategies improvement; and 
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monitoring, evaluation, and upgrading into the municipal development plan 
and regular workload of LGU staff. 
The multi-stakeholder nature of adaptation to climate change implies that the 
solution rests not on a single actor but on all affected sectors.  Policymakers need to 
be aware of the barriers to action, and treat policy options accordingly. As pointed out 
by Liverani (2009), relevant policy areas include: communications, institutional 
measures, and social norms. Well-designed climate communication campaigns that 
address individuals as members of a local community can empower them to act.  
The following recommendations in communication strategies can change 
people‘s behavior:  
1. Convince people about the seriousness of the problem related to climate 
change by making clear to them the magnitude of possible losses that they 
may incur and the probability of severe personal losses that may occur in the 
immediate future.  It may also help to emphasize the impacts of memorable 
events (e.g., Typhoon Milenyo) and likely further events. 
2. Clarify to people the most effective adaptation strategies to counter their vague 
and incorrect ideas about the problem. 
3. Inform people about relevant social policies and public action and how the 
changes in the individual action and community can help combat climate 
change. 
4. Point out that effective adaptation is one‘s moral obligation to society and the 
future generation. 
5. In terms of adaptation decisions, give priority to proactive actions reducing 
future risk. However, since significant risks will remain, then also provide for 
reactive approaches to recover from unavoidable impacts. 
Beyond communication, the suggestion of Liverani (2009) for climate policy 
is to design interventions that take into account psychological and social constraints to 
positive action. Effective adaptation interventions should include institutional 
measures that address communities‘ own perceptions of risk, vulnerability, and 
capacity. The institutionalization of participatory self-assessments for local, and even 
national disaster preparedness, adaptation planning, and mitigation targets can be 
useful in this. Given some level of uncertainty in forecasting climate events and 
possible impacts, policy makers should ensure continuous monitoring of underlying 
climate parameters that signal stress and shock, and of aspects of adaptive capacity. 
Social norm-based appeals for pro-environmental behavior are superior to 
traditional persuasive appeals (Liverani 2009). Social norms are established patterns 
of behavior that most people approve of, or the yardstick individuals use to assess the 
appropriateness of their own behavior. The basic idea is that individuals want to act in 
a socially acceptable way and tend to follow the lead of others, particularly when the 
others are numerous and appear similar to them. Rather than look for clues about how 
to behave when unsure about conduct and outcomes, people rely on what others do. It 
points to the potential role of social capital in enhancing adaptive capacity (Beckly et 
al. 2002 cited in Swanson et al. 2007).  Building social capital would be crucial to 
collectively combine and mobilize different forms of capital within institutional and 
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